`Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible`

`persons?...e.g. materialism.`

Bren

On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a existence a non-zero measure. Terren On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the infinite computations going through my state". Otherwise, I think the physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the particulars of how the UD unfolds. Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well think of it's computations as completed. I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists. BrentTerren On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you". Brent On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the ordinality of the infinities involved. TerrenNot zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is very small, but non-zero. But we already knew that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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