On 8/29/2012 2:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

    On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
    On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
    Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they
    abound in arithmetic.

        This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that
    all copies are identical and this by the principle of
    indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality
    generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state
    association to a mind, but this would contradict comp.

    No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics
    isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by
    the UD.

    Hi Brent,

        Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase
    "generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated
    meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer

      But I think it is right that there must be an associated
    physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world
    it experiences.

        Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining
    about in his step 8.

I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only thing he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy on the infinite set of computations that goes through our current state (the one assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution level) that diverge on the next step.


Hi Quentin,

    You are technically correct, but that merely sidesteps the point.

The problem that I am trying to overcome is the non-uniqueness of Godel numberings. There are an infinite number of currect states (of which "our current state" is one) and each of these has an infinite number of computations running though them. I agree with this piece of the idea, btw. The states are identical to each other in the sense that there is nothing that distinguishes them so we need a mechanism that relates them in a non-trivial way. What I am considering is a way to define orderings on them; a way to daisy chain them by defining the fixed point of one (a spacial point) to be not a fixed point on the next one. There is a rule involved that relates the possibility of a state to be a fixed point to whether or not it was previously, thereby setting up a precedent rule. The key is to use the use of a constant by a non-standard model of arithmetic as a one-time fixed point (like a unique one time cypher for the Godel numbering), so that we can use the plurality of non-equivalent non-standard models as a boon and not a curse. We end up with strings of strongly related models and a nice way to solve the white rabbit problem.

      Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours
    or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.

        Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white
    rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?




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