I think that the Platonic realm is just time, and that time is nothing but 

Thought is the experience of generating hypothetical experience.

The mistake is presuming that because we perceive exterior realism as a 
topology of bodies that the ground of being must be defined in those terms. 
In fact, the very experience you are having right now - with your eyes 
closed or half asleep...this is a concretely and physically real part of 
the universe, it just isn't experienced as objects in space because you are 
the subject of the experience. If anything, the outside world is a Platonic 
realm of geometric perspectives and rational expectations. Interior realism 
is private time travel and eidetic fugues; metaphor, irony, anticipations, 
etc. Not only Platonic, but Chthonic. Thought doesn't come from a realm, 
realms come from thought.


On Thursday, August 30, 2012 11:54:32 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>      What is thinking ? Parmenides thought that thinking and being are 
> one, which IMHO I agree with. 
> Thoughts come to us from the Platonic realm, which I personally, perhaps 
> mistakenly, 
> associate with what would be Penrose's incomputable realm. 
> Here is a brief discussion of technological or machine thinking vs lived 
> experience. 
> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00201740310002398#tabModule IMHO 
> Because computers cannot have lived experience, they cannot think. Inquiry: 
> An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Volume 
> 46<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20?open=46#vol_46>, 
> Issue 3 <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/sinq20/46/3>, 2003 
>  Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and 
> Lived-Experience
>  Version of record first published: 05 Nov 2010
> Heidegger's treatment of 'machination' in the Beiträge zur Philosophie 
> begins the critique of technological thinking that would centrally 
> characterize his later work. Unlike later discussions of technology, the 
> critique of machination in Beiträge connects its arising to the 
> predominance of 'lived-experience' ( Erlebnis ) as the concealed basis for 
> the possibility of a pre-delineated, rule-based metaphysical understanding 
> of the world. In this essay I explore this connection. The unity of 
> machination and lived-experience becomes intelligible when both are traced 
> to their common root in the primordial Greek attitude of techne , 
> originally a basic attitude of wondering knowledge of nature. But with this 
> common root revealed, the basic connection between machination and 
> lived-experience also emerges as an important development of one of the 
> deepest guiding thoughts of the Western philosophical tradition: the 
> Parmenidean assertion of the sameness of being and thinking. In the 
> Beiträge 's analysis of machination and lived-experience, Heidegger hopes 
> to discover a way of thinking that avoids the Western tradition's constant 
> basic assumption of self-identity, an assumption which culminates in the 
> modern picture of the autonomous, self-identical subject aggressively set 
> over against a pre-delineated world of objects in a relationship of mutual 
> confrontation. In the final section, I investigate an important and 
> illuminating parallel to Heidegger's result: the consideration of the 
> relationship between experience and technological ways of thinking that 
> forms the basis of the late Wittgenstein's famous rule-following 
> considerations.
> everything-list
>  Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>
> 8/30/2012 
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
> everything could function."

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