On 07 Sep 2012, at 17:11, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/7/2012 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Sep 2012, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer
to?
The computational locality used in the local universal system.
Dear Bruno,
Could you elaborate a bit more on this remark? How do you define
a " local universal system"? What is "local" for you?
All universal system are local. Here I meant a universal system that I
can handle in my neighborhood, like my brain or my laptop. Local means
that action exerts influence on their most probable universal
neighborhood.
In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone
and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform
arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how
to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where
does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come
in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what
point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even
if it could, why should it do such a thing?
Because it concerns a machine looking at herself and its probable
environment.
As I think of it, a machine cannot literally "look at herself";
it can only "look at an image of herself" and that image could be
subject to errors. This allows me to relate an image that a machine
might have of itself with the image the machine might have of
another machine and thus I found the concept of bisimulation.
Additionally, we can define cases where the image and the machine
itself are identical in every possible way and thus are one and the
same thing (via principle of identity of indiscernibles).
It seems to me that most of our disagreements flow from your
assumption that the image of a machine and the machine are strictly
isomorphic, while I assume such only in certain special cases.
To get physics, you can (and should) restrict yourself to ideally
correct machine.
Then the logic shows that it is unavoidable that the machine get
non justifiable truth.
I agree. But "what is Truth"?
Arithmetical truth. You can define it in second order logic, or in set
theory, but of course this does not really define it. You can
represent it by the set of Gödel number of the true arithmetical
sentences. It is a highly complex set not even nameable or describable
by the machine.
I see truth to be a parameter of the degree of matching between an
object and its image. It is not confined to some single spectrum for
all things. Different types of objects require different kinds of
spectra for their truth valuations and thus are not always
commensurable.
In everyday life, but we reason in a theory.
You can see that informally with thought experiment, like in UDA,
or formally in the logics of self-reference.
I have problems with the technical aspects of the UDA in almost
every step.
Then you have to make that precise.
My problem is that I do not have your set of definitions and
intuitions in my mind as I read your material.
UDA is simpler to 14 years old, than graduates. UDA is rather easy,
and I think that is what people misses. It is simple. Of course the
MGA (step 8) is a bit harder, but you can have all the gist of it by
UDA1-7, already.
Some people, like Jason today, can even pass the step 8, by just
rejecting the notion of virtual or arithmetical zombie. Step 8 just
address the Ptere Jones (and sometimes Brent) critics that we need a
real computer for having a real consciousness, but this introduce non
Turing emulability in the mind (by step 8).
I see holes and blind spots and tacit assumptions everywhere,
Without specific remarks, I can't help.
but this holds true of the material of most people that I read and
so I an not upset with you for this appearance. It could be the beam
in my eye that i see as a mote in your eye... Thus I ask you many
many questions, to lern to see what you see the way that you see it.
SO far I cannot understand how it is that you do not see the
necessity of physical implementation of computations.
They are necessary only locally, and this is provided in arithmetic.
Then step 8 explains why reifying matter cannot relate consciousness
to it, making primitive matter epinomenal.
I am studying the work of C.S. Peirce and others int eh area of
semiotics to learn if it might help me explain the problem that I see.
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear
what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it
seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually
would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document
and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the
original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of
the original. That's step 5, precisely.
You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the
problem for you is in the assumption.
Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove
physicality
At some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum.
and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.
Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to
explain (from some other realm). It is not a lott, but science
works that way. We don't know the public truth. We can only make
clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose tests.
Why not just recognize it formally and say that consciousness
doesn't need any explanation other than the experience of "this"
and "that".
I am OK with this, and that is why I refer mostly to the first
person discourse than to consciousness per se.
But of course an explanation of why the 1p comes from is given.
Y4ees, we have to show how the 1p is necessary and its origin.
If it is irreducible, then a general class of consequences of its
presence is helpful for its explanation.
With comp the Bp & p works very well. I don't see what is missing, as
the counter-intuitive part is explained already by the machine. Keep
in mind that we assume comp at the start, without ever pretending it
is truth.
.
Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them
in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of
comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter. It
still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of mind
or matter at all?
Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see the
general shape of the solution, which is a
reduction of physics into arithmetic, with the advantage that we
get a clear explanation of the difference of qualia and quanta.
And we can test the quanta.
I'm ok with reducing physics to math or math to physics, but
neither have any link back to experience.
Physics doesn't, except an embryonic one with thermodynamic and
Everett QM.
I have yet to see this clearly. I confess that that is cause by
my inability to read your materials that are only available in
French. If only they where in English or Spanish, I could read
them... But this does not help me with the problem that i see in the
MGA and Maudlin's argument. My claim is that Maudlin is simply wrong
in his thinking about contrafactuals. The present or non-presense of
the parts of the machine that are connected by even rusty chains
makes a difference.
How?
The mere possibility of a different configuration is something that
cannot be ignored.
How can you say yes to the doctor then? He might as well suppress a
neuron which has no use in any computation, because they date for
prehistoric time. The doctor promise only that you will be able to see
the next soccer club.
If non functioning part are necessary, you just abandon comp.
This is the same thing as what we see in QM, where we must sum over
all possible paths, even those that are grotesquely unphysical, to
achieve a accurate calculation of some probability distribution of
events.
But comp and UDA explains exactly why we have to do that to recover
the first person (plural) reality. To use this to doubt of comp is
invalid, as comp explains this appearance.
Computer science does, and that is what I am illustrating, notably
through the duplication experiences, and the intensional variants
of G and G*.
We are thinking of duplication differently. I wish we could
revisit the "God has no name" thread and recap the ideas we explored
therein.
I agree. Why does 1p machine theory propose the existence of
feeling though?
Feeling are handled by Bp & Dt & p, and behave like feeling and
qualia. They have shape, and many attributes, but are private and
incommunicable as such, etc.
How is their "shape" quantified? Topology?
Topology, analysis, von Neuman algebra, temperley Lieb algebra, Kripe
or scott-montague semantics, etc.
Anything providing a semantics for the inetnsional variants of G and
G*. Many open problems here. That was the goal: showing that comp does
not solve the mind-body problem per se, only that it can help to
reformulate in math.
These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality,
this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only
characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The
significance does not arise from the same level in which it is
transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.
This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p self-reference
and the 1p self-reference. I think.
I don't think that I do (nor does Searle or Korzybski, Magritte...)
I don't see a reference to first person in "ceci n'est pas une
pipe". Everything is 3p, at that level. The 1p is a fixed
point of personal doubting procedures, and is not representable in
any way, provably so for machines.
But I maintain that we need to have a language that allows for
the possibility of multiple minds, even if their thought that they
have separate identities is an illusion. We cannot operate as if the
mind was a single tower.
No problem with multiple minds, as they are all incarnated in the UD*.
The problem is with the hunting of the white rabbits. I only show that
it is a real problem in arithmetic, ad show how a form of quantum
logic appears and seems promising to solve it. I show the UD or
arithmetic contains the shadow of a vast random phase capable of
making rare the white rabbits.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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