On 07 Sep 2012, at 17:11, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/7/2012 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2012, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to?

The computational locality used in the local universal system.

Dear Bruno,

Could you elaborate a bit more on this remark? How do you define a " local universal system"? What is "local" for you?

All universal system are local. Here I meant a universal system that I can handle in my neighborhood, like my brain or my laptop. Local means that action exerts influence on their most probable universal neighborhood.

In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even if it could, why should it do such a thing?

Because it concerns a machine looking at herself and its probable environment.

As I think of it, a machine cannot literally "look at herself"; it can only "look at an image of herself" and that image could be subject to errors. This allows me to relate an image that a machine might have of itself with the image the machine might have of another machine and thus I found the concept of bisimulation. Additionally, we can define cases where the image and the machine itself are identical in every possible way and thus are one and the same thing (via principle of identity of indiscernibles). It seems to me that most of our disagreements flow from your assumption that the image of a machine and the machine are strictly isomorphic, while I assume such only in certain special cases.

To get physics, you can (and should) restrict yourself to ideally correct machine.

Then the logic shows that it is unavoidable that the machine get non justifiable truth.

    I agree. But "what is Truth"?

Arithmetical truth. You can define it in second order logic, or in set theory, but of course this does not really define it. You can represent it by the set of Gödel number of the true arithmetical sentences. It is a highly complex set not even nameable or describable by the machine.

I see truth to be a parameter of the degree of matching between an object and its image. It is not confined to some single spectrum for all things. Different types of objects require different kinds of spectra for their truth valuations and thus are not always commensurable.

In everyday life, but we reason in a theory.

You can see that informally with thought experiment, like in UDA, or formally in the logics of self-reference.

I have problems with the technical aspects of the UDA in almost every step.

Then you have to make that precise.

My problem is that I do not have your set of definitions and intuitions in my mind as I read your material.

UDA is simpler to 14 years old, than graduates. UDA is rather easy, and I think that is what people misses. It is simple. Of course the MGA (step 8) is a bit harder, but you can have all the gist of it by UDA1-7, already.

Some people, like Jason today, can even pass the step 8, by just rejecting the notion of virtual or arithmetical zombie. Step 8 just address the Ptere Jones (and sometimes Brent) critics that we need a real computer for having a real consciousness, but this introduce non Turing emulability in the mind (by step 8).

I see holes and blind spots and tacit assumptions everywhere,

Without specific remarks, I can't help.

but this holds true of the material of most people that I read and so I an not upset with you for this appearance. It could be the beam in my eye that i see as a mote in your eye... Thus I ask you many many questions, to lern to see what you see the way that you see it. SO far I cannot understand how it is that you do not see the necessity of physical implementation of computations.

They are necessary only locally, and this is provided in arithmetic. Then step 8 explains why reifying matter cannot relate consciousness to it, making primitive matter epinomenal.

I am studying the work of C.S. Peirce and others int eh area of semiotics to learn if it might help me explain the problem that I see.

Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.

Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.

You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.

Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicality

At some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum.

and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.

Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to explain (from some other realm). It is not a lott, but science works that way. We don't know the public truth. We can only make clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose tests.

Why not just recognize it formally and say that consciousness doesn't need any explanation other than the experience of "this" and "that".

I am OK with this, and that is why I refer mostly to the first person discourse than to consciousness per se.
But of course an explanation of why the 1p comes from is given.

Y4ees, we have to show how the 1p is necessary and its origin. If it is irreducible, then a general class of consequences of its presence is helpful for its explanation.

With comp the Bp & p works very well. I don't see what is missing, as the counter-intuitive part is explained already by the machine. Keep in mind that we assume comp at the start, without ever pretending it is truth.


Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of mind or matter at all?

Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see the general shape of the solution, which is a reduction of physics into arithmetic, with the advantage that we get a clear explanation of the difference of qualia and quanta. And we can test the quanta.

I'm ok with reducing physics to math or math to physics, but neither have any link back to experience.

Physics doesn't, except an embryonic one with thermodynamic and Everett QM.

I have yet to see this clearly. I confess that that is cause by my inability to read your materials that are only available in French. If only they where in English or Spanish, I could read them... But this does not help me with the problem that i see in the MGA and Maudlin's argument. My claim is that Maudlin is simply wrong in his thinking about contrafactuals. The present or non-presense of the parts of the machine that are connected by even rusty chains makes a difference.


The mere possibility of a different configuration is something that cannot be ignored.

How can you say yes to the doctor then? He might as well suppress a neuron which has no use in any computation, because they date for prehistoric time. The doctor promise only that you will be able to see the next soccer club.
If non functioning part are necessary, you just abandon comp.

This is the same thing as what we see in QM, where we must sum over all possible paths, even those that are grotesquely unphysical, to achieve a accurate calculation of some probability distribution of events.

But comp and UDA explains exactly why we have to do that to recover the first person (plural) reality. To use this to doubt of comp is invalid, as comp explains this appearance.

Computer science does, and that is what I am illustrating, notably through the duplication experiences, and the intensional variants of G and G*.

We are thinking of duplication differently. I wish we could revisit the "God has no name" thread and recap the ideas we explored therein.

I agree. Why does 1p machine theory propose the existence of feeling though?

Feeling are handled by Bp & Dt & p, and behave like feeling and qualia. They have shape, and many attributes, but are private and incommunicable as such, etc.

    How is their "shape" quantified? Topology?

Topology, analysis, von Neuman algebra, temperley Lieb algebra, Kripe or scott-montague semantics, etc. Anything providing a semantics for the inetnsional variants of G and G*. Many open problems here. That was the goal: showing that comp does not solve the mind-body problem per se, only that it can help to reformulate in math.

These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level in which it is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.

This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p self-reference and the 1p self-reference. I think.

I don't think that I do (nor does Searle or Korzybski, Magritte...)

I don't see a reference to first person in "ceci n'est pas une pipe". Everything is 3p, at that level. The 1p is a fixed point of personal doubting procedures, and is not representable in any way, provably so for machines.

But I maintain that we need to have a language that allows for the possibility of multiple minds, even if their thought that they have separate identities is an illusion. We cannot operate as if the mind was a single tower.

No problem with multiple minds, as they are all incarnated in the UD*.
The problem is with the hunting of the white rabbits. I only show that it is a real problem in arithmetic, ad show how a form of quantum logic appears and seems promising to solve it. I show the UD or arithmetic contains the shadow of a vast random phase capable of making rare the white rabbits.



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