On 9/7/2012 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Sep 2012, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal

        On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

        Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a
        challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I
        disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here
        are my objections to the first step and the stipulated
        assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to
        accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I
        have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he
        sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and
        if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it
        anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the
        point, since the only point that matters is the actual
        truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's
        actual relation to physics and information. Given the
        fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think
        that implications for teleportation and AI
        simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory
        rather than thorough consideration of realism would be
        reckless to say the least.

        *Step one* talks about teleportation in terms of being
        reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were
        true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would
        be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would
        be sufficient.

        That is step 6.

    I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure
    the teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its
    annihilation is
    represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow"
    from 1.

        Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine
        could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper,
        and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This
        activity would have to collectively result in the
        teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation
        as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on
        paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does
        the experience of the now disembodied person come in?

        As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means
        used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has
        nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of
        consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness
        with the logical abstract computations.

    So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the
    overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or
    does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of
    disconnected effort-ness?

    Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time.
    Its local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can
    refer to time and space, but that's particular content of an
    atemporal consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA).

If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer to?

The computational locality used in the local universal system.

Dear Bruno,

Could you elaborate a bit more on this remark? How do you define a " local universal system"? What is "local" for you?

In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where does the interpretation of these trillion events per second come in? What knows what all of the computations add up to be? At what point does the 'local content' begin to itch and turn blue? Even if it could, why should it do such a thing?

Because it concerns a machine looking at herself and its probable environment.

As I think of it, a machine cannot literally "look at herself"; it can only "look at an image of herself" and that image could be subject to errors. This allows me to relate an image that a machine might have of itself with the image the machine might have of another machine and thus I found the concept of bisimulation. Additionally, we can define cases where the image and the machine itself are identical in every possible way and thus are one and the same thing (via principle of identity of indiscernibles). It seems to me that most of our disagreements flow from your assumption that the image of a machine and the machine are strictly isomorphic, while I assume such only in certain special cases.

Then the logic shows that it is unavoidable that the machine get non justifiable truth.

I agree. But "what is Truth"? I see truth to be a parameter of the degree of matching between an object and its image. It is not confined to some single spectrum for all things. Different types of objects require different kinds of spectra for their truth valuations and thus are not always commensurable.

You can see that informally with thought experiment, like in UDA, or formally in the logics of self-reference.

I have problems with the technical aspects of the UDA in almost every step. My problem is that I do not have your set of definitions and intuitions in my mind as I read your material. I see holes and blind spots and tacit assumptions everywhere, but this holds true of the material of most people that I read and so I an not upset with you for this appearance. It could be the beam in my eye that i see as a mote in your eye... Thus I ask you many many questions, to lern to see what you see the way that you see it. SO far I cannot understand how it is that you do not see the necessity of physical implementation of computations. I am studying the work of C.S. Peirce and others int eh area of semiotics to learn if it might help me explain the problem that I see.

        Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not
        clear what role this actually plays in the process, except
        to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what
        it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an
        original document and email the scan, I have sent a
        duplicate, not teleported the original.

        Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation
        of the original. That's step 5, precisely.

        You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the
        problem for you is in the assumption.

    Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove

    At some place, yes. In a reductio ad absurdum.

    and presume consciousness to explain consciousness.

    Yes. Like we presume (at some metalevel) anything we want to
    explain (from some other realm). It is not a lott, but science
    works that way. We don't know the public truth. We can only make
    clear our hypothesis and reason, and propose tests.

Why not just recognize it formally and say that consciousness doesn't need any explanation other than the experience of "this" and "that".

I am OK with this, and that is why I refer mostly to the first person discourse than to consciousness per se.
But of course an explanation of why the 1p comes from is given.

Y4ees, we have to show how the 1p is necessary and its origin. If it is irreducible, then a general class of consequences of its presence is helpful for its explanation.


    Computation seems to have nothing to do with either one of them
    in comp other than the fact of the plasticity and aloofness of
    comp can be seen as a sign that it is neither mind nor matter.
    It still doesn't answer the question of why have appearances of
    mind or matter at all?

    Comp is used to formulate the problem in math. Then we can see
    the general shape of the solution, which is a reduction of
    physics into arithmetic, with the advantage that we get a clear
    explanation of the difference of qualia and quanta. And we can
    test the quanta.

I'm ok with reducing physics to math or math to physics, but neither have any link back to experience.

Physics doesn't, except an embryonic one with thermodynamic and Everett QM.

I have yet to see this clearly. I confess that that is cause by my inability to read your materials that are only available in French. If only they where in English or Spanish, I could read them... But this does not help me with the problem that i see in the MGA and Maudlin's argument. My claim is that Maudlin is simply wrong in his thinking about contrafactuals. The present or non-presense of the parts of the machine that are connected by even rusty chains makes a difference. The mere possibility of a different configuration is something that cannot be ignored. This is the same thing as what we see in QM, where we must sum over all possible paths, even those that are grotesquely unphysical, to achieve a accurate calculation of some probability distribution of events.

Computer science does, and that is what I am illustrating, notably through the duplication experiences, and the intensional variants of G and G*.

We are thinking of duplication differently. I wish we could revisit the "God has no name" thread and recap the ideas we explored therein.

    If there is a reason, then that reason is the nature of the
    cosmos, not the filing and organizing system that indexes it's

        I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

        *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that
        props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that
        you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain
        function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain
        devices, then you have already agreed that human
        individuality is a universal commodity.

        Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It
        asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.

    It can't ask for anything by itself though.


We can't coerce data into keeping secrets. All forms of secrecy require some kind of social control of information. Data will always talk to strangers. (see my post today: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!topic/everything-list/L9LbbtQAN9U)


    We are the ones to whom the significance relates.

    Actually God told me yesterday that we are wrong on this. Only
    the jumping spider can do that.

Jumping spiders and God are us too.

OK :)

    Information is nothing but an experience that can be remembered
    and transmitted to other experiencers through formation.

        *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation,
        irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed
        computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of
        computation, completely divorced from realism from the
        start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does
        data enter or exit a computation?

        It is a discovery by mathematicians.

    And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical
    theory, but it doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity
    and physics.

    Physics, or not physics are not among the hypothesis. More in the

    It assumes weightless computation that generates weight (for not
    particular reason).

    We search the reason. You say "for no particular reason" without
    providing a reason.

The realism of physical weight in the universe is what I am saying is one of the things that is not derived from pure computation.

Indeed. Such a realism is shown to be an illusion, even if a persistent one.

There seems to be no anchoring in mass (despite info-theoretic confusions about entropy). To comp, it makes no difference whether a program operates on a galactic scale or microscopic scale - the code is weightless. That is not our experience of galaxies and atoms though.

But we can justify exactly that. Those are experiences, and they correspond to stable patterns of information, not to primitive mass or realistic physics.

You talk, like many, like if the primitive physical universe was a datum, and not an hypothesis. This comes from the fact that such an hypothesis has been hardwired in our brain since a long time, for it of course an hypothesis. Indeed, it is refuted in the comp theory. You might think that this refute comp, but then we have already agreed on that. That is why I say that your position is coherent; you keep matter and abandon comp. No problem, given that my point is that *in* comp, we have to explain matter from non material relations.

        *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self
        justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is
        literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is
        really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and
        saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
        constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication
        of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by
        virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each
        logic circuit? Where do errors come from?

        They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth.
        Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that
        is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of
        Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so
        correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect
        "soon enough".

        Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of
        machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I

    I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal
    logic and Gödelian-Löbianian ideas, but I feel like even this
    surface understanding is enough to tell me that it is ultimately
    a red herring.

    This is self-defeating.

Why, do you feel yourself to be defeated ;) ?

    These concepts seem to just be about self-reference - maps of
    maps with no territory. Great for simulating some aspects of
    thought, because indeed, thinking has to do with copying copies
    and intellectual grammar, but feeling doesn't.

    The machine knows that, already. Feeling and first person notion
    have no 3p representation at all. For logical reason, explainable
    with the math above.

I agree. Why does 1p machine theory propose the existence of feeling though?

Feeling are handled by Bp & Dt & p, and behave like feeling and qualia. They have shape, and many attributes, but are private and incommunicable as such, etc.

    How is their "shape" quantified? Topology?

    These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In
    reality, this sentence does not refer to itself. There are only
    characters, or pixels, or optical phenomena here. The
    significance does not arise from the same level in which it is
    transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une pipe.

    This has already been commented. You confuse the 3p
    self-reference and the 1p self-reference. I think.

I don't think that I do (nor does Searle or Korzybski, Magritte...)

I don't see a reference to first person in "ceci n'est pas une pipe". Everything is 3p, at that level. The 1p is a fixed point of personal doubting procedures, and is not representable in any way, provably so for machines.

But I maintain that we need to have a language that allows for the possibility of multiple minds, even if their thought that they have separate identities is an illusion. We cannot operate as if the mind was a single tower.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>




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