On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 2:02:20 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: > > > > On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:07 PM, Craig Weinberg > <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >> On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, "Stephen P. King" <step...@charter.net> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> >> Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but >>> >> Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that >>> >> of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to >>> >> say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a >>> >> zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is >>> >> entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the >>> >> doctor. >>> >> >>> >> Terren >>> > Dear Terren, >>> > >>> > You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact >>> > that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case >>> > of "of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal" and "of the >>> > "real" Craig eating the "real" meal". >>> >>> Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently >>> responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no >>> clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of >>> its sensations to the brain as a whole) >>> >> >> There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for >> the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans >> have human qualia. >> > > While that may be, brains can only talk about brain qualia. They are > silent on neuron qualia, carbon atom qualia, or electron qualia. >
My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. > >> There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are >> sensitivities to other experiences. >> > > It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are > sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. > It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological and logical antithesis is foregrounded. > >> They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. >> They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on >> sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. >> > > Where do you get this stuff? > >From the future? > > >> >> , the only difference that >>> makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. >>> >> >> Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. >> There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for >> instance, is just as patterned as the color green. >> > > The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of > neurons. > Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate them to something familiar. > > >> >> >>> >>> This is the only time information that makes a difference to other >>> neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the >>> information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire >>> or not to fire. >>> >> >> Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to >> their environment without nervous systems. >> > > Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring > neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is > whether their neighbors are firing. > It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is modulated. > > >> You are conflating the physiology associated with human experience with >> the ontology of subjective experience in general. Information and bits are >> not real, they are analytical abstractions that are not capable of any >> causes or effects. >> >> > > According to you, only experiences are real. If this is where you stand > then you should admit that this idea gives up any hope of explaining > anything about experience. > Not at all. Admitting that experience is the ground of being is the necessary starting point to explain anything about experience. There is a whole new universe to explore. > > >> >>> Using information theory, and known limitations if information >>> representation in physics, It could be shown that a biological brain >>> has only some certain and finite information available to it. This >>> places an upper bound on the things it knows and can talk about. An >>> equivalent artificial brain could be engineered to contain the same >>> information and the same knowledge. There would be nothing the >>> biological brain could know that the artificial brain does not: they >>> were created to have identical information content. If one knows 2+2 >>> is 4, they both do, if one knows what red is like, they both do. >>> >> >> Information feels nothing and knows nothing, and it never will. >> > > I didn't say information feels or knows, only that the brains, (biological > or artificial), in the above hypothetical, have the same limited > information and therefore neither is wiser or more knowledgeable than the > other. > They don't have the same information, since in-formation is a subjective in-terpretation of objectively meaningless forms. Even though a picture of a person might look like a living person on TV, they are actually not living people. An artificial brain may look like we think a brain looks, and act like we think a brain acts, but its just a puppet running on recorded instructions to operate in exactly the way that best fools us into imagining it is alive. Craig > Jason > > >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> > There has to be a "grundlagen" level at which there is not a >>> > "simulation", there has to be a "real thing" that the simulations >>> > are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from >>> > Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the >>> > "real word" *is* the best possible "simulation" and thus it is >>> > literally the "real thing" that all images that we might have of it >>> > in our minds are mere simulations. >>> > Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it "from the >>> > inside" and reporting to us his observations. >>> >> >>> >> On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King < >>> step...@charter.net >>> >> > wrote: >>> >>> On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>>> Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the >>> >>>> simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by >>> >>>> inviting myself >>> >>>> to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "It's the best in the city!", says B1ll. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "That sounds great, because I am really hungry.", I reply >>> >>>> anxiously. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty >>> >>>> seats. B1ll >>> >>>> gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a >>> >>>> restaurant. >>> >>>> I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a >>> >>>> waiter appears, >>> >>>> offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a >>> >>>> curious >>> >>>> resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu >>> >>>> too. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "I've already ordered", says B1ll. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is >>> >>>> called "The >>> >>>> thing that you want to order". Wow. This is impressive. I look up >>> >>>> and notice >>> >>>> that what the waiter's nametag says. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with >>> >>>> everything on >>> >>>> it." >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Göd >>> >>>> elian soup >>> >>>> with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year" >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "Sure" >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "Voila", Brun-0 exclaims. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my >>> >>>> hand with a >>> >>>> gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, >>> >>>> rotating in >>> >>>> space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the >>> >>>> menu over. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which >>> >>>> pops into >>> >>>> life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! >>> >>>> >>> >>>> It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely >>> >>>> real. I am >>> >>>> being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to >>> >>>> unveil a >>> >>>> beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of >>> >>>> sumptuous >>> >>>> sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup >>> >>>> on the >>> >>>> calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is >>> >>>> constructed >>> >>>> of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where >>> >>>> p is >>> >>>> delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non- >>> >>>> regurgitation >>> >>>> parameters'. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and >>> >>>> knife >>> >>>> and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I >>> >>>> seem to be >>> >>>> making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Turning to B1ll, I ask, >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "What did you order?" >>> >>>> >>> >>>> "I already ate.", he replies. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> As I look down at my clean plate and remember the great meal that >>> >>>> I just >>> >>>> had, I feel unusually satisfied. Curiously I can't remember >>> >>>> exactly what it >>> >>>> was that I ate, but I no reason to care. I can't care. I believe >>> >>>> that I must >>> >>>> have eaten exactly what I wanted. >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Craig >>> >>> Check out the Matrix version of this story: >>> >>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?**v=Z7BuQFUhsRM<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7BuQFUhsRM> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Onward! >>> >>> >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> >>> >>> http://webpages.charter.net/**stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html<http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> >>> Groups >>> >>> "Everything List" group. >>> >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com >>> >>> . >>> >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> >>> everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>> >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> >>> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en>. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > Onward! >>> > >>> > Stephen >>> > >>> > http://webpages.charter.net/**stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html<http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html> >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> > Groups "Everything List" group. >>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@** >>> googlegroups.com >>> > . >>> > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> >>> > . >>> > >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/bl-xc-8KIFMJ. >> >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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