On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 5:41 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> On 9/18/2012 12:25 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:37 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>>> Hi Terren,
>>> "Comp is false" is too strong. He is explaining how comp is
>>> "incomplete". The movie graph argument is flawed.
>> I'm not sure what that means, that comp is incomplete. You either
>> start from the assumption that your consciousness can be faithfully
>> preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant, or you don't. What am
>> I missing?
>> I admit I haven't followed all of the list postings lately, but I
>> haven't seen a coherent explanation of why the movie graph argument is
>> flawed... if I missed it, can you point me to where this was
>> Hi Terren,
> I have no problem at all with the idea that my "consciousness can be
> faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant" so long as
> functional equivalence is exactly maintained. But the MGA seems to neglect
> the very real possibility that consciousness seems to depend on things that
> don't happen just as much as it depends on things that do happen. Maudlin
> and Bruno are effectively arguing that "things that don't happen" are thus
> irrelevant and should and even must be dismissed in considering
> consciousness. We are being sold a bill of goods if we continue to thing in
> terms of classical logic that does not look at both sides of a set (the
> members, boundary and the set's complement) as involved in a function.
I think I addressed this point in another thread. Things do happen in what
you and I might call "physical universes", and they do matter and are
relevant for our experience. Bruno's first point is only that due
to indeterminacy, we never see any one physical universe underlying
ourselves, but an infinite continuum. His second point is that this
makes physics explainable in terms of something else (physics is no longer
the bottom layer in the sciences).
I don't see that you, Bruno, or I disagree regarding computationalism or
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