On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 2:02:20 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: > >> >> >> On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, "Stephen P. King" <step...@charter.net> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> > On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >> Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but >>>> >> Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - >>>> that >>>> >> of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to >>>> >> say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a >>>> >> zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is >>>> >> entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the >>>> >> doctor. >>>> >> >>>> >> Terren >>>> > Dear Terren, >>>> > >>>> > You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact >>>> >>>> > that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case >>>> > of "of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal" and "of the >>>> > "real" Craig eating the "real" meal". >>>> >>>> Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently >>>> responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no >>>> clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of >>>> its sensations to the brain as a whole) >>>> >>> >>> There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for >>> the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans >>> have human qualia. >>> >> >> While that may be, brains can only talk about brain qualia. They are >> silent on neuron qualia, carbon atom qualia, or electron qualia. >> > > My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of > sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically > recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. > Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. > > >> >>> There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are >>> sensitivities to other experiences. >>> >> >> It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are >> sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. >> > > It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a > capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and > trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological > and logical antithesis is foregrounded. > James Hutton, considered a father of Geology, was largely unread because his prose was so difficult to parse. He had many great ideas, he even beat Charles Darwin regarding the idea of natural selection ( http://www.strangescience.net/hutton.htm ). Yet, his style of writing was so impenetrable that most of his ideas were ignored in his life time. After he died one of his friends took up re-writing his books and it became a huge success. > > >> >>> They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. >>> They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on >>> sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. >>> >> >> Where do you get this stuff? >> > > From the future? > > >> >> >>> >>> , the only difference that >>>> makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. >>>> >>> >>> Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. >>> There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for >>> instance, is just as patterned as the color green. >>> >> >> The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of >> neurons. >> > > Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we > look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate > them to something familiar. > If you look at some MRI scan of them, they are meaningless, but not if you *are* them. Then they do the correlation for you. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> This is the only time information that makes a difference to other >>>> neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the >>>> >>>> information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire >>>> or not to fire. >>>> >>> >>> Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to >>> their environment without nervous systems. >>> >> >> Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring >> neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is >> whether their neighbors are firing. >> > > It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their > neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and > show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that > the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the > iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and > participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only > the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only > the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is modulated. > So in your theory the firing plays is only a minor role in the operation and function of the brain? > >> >> >>> You are conflating the physiology associated with human experience with >>> the ontology of subjective experience in general. Information and bits are >>> not real, they are analytical abstractions that are not capable of any >>> causes or effects. >>> >>> >> >> According to you, only experiences are real. If this is where you stand >> then you should admit that this idea gives up any hope of explaining >> anything about experience. >> > > Not at all. Admitting that experience is the ground of being is the > necessary starting point to explain anything about experience. There is a > whole new universe to explore. > > >> >> >>> >>>> Using information theory, and known limitations if information >>>> representation in physics, It could be shown that a biological brain >>>> has only some certain and finite information available to it. This >>>> places an upper bound on the things it knows and can talk about. An >>>> equivalent artificial brain could be engineered to contain the same >>>> information and the same knowledge. There would be nothing the >>>> biological brain could know that the artificial brain does not: they >>>> were created to have identical information content. If one knows 2+2 >>>> is 4, they both do, if one knows what red is like, they both do. >>>> >>> >>> Information feels nothing and knows nothing, and it never will. >>> >> >> I didn't say information feels or knows, only that the brains, >> (biological or artificial), in the above hypothetical, have the same >> limited information and therefore neither is wiser or more knowledgeable >> than the other. >> > > They don't have the same information, since in-formation is a subjective > in-terpretation of objectively meaningless forms. Even though a picture of > a person might look like a living person on TV, they are actually not > living people. An artificial brain may look like we think a brain looks, > and act like we think a brain acts, but its just a puppet running on > recorded instructions to operate in exactly the way that best fools us into > imagining it is alive. > > Information content can be objectively measured. There is a whole field of information theory based on this. 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