On 9/18/2012 12:25 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:37 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
"Comp is false" is too strong. He is explaining how comp is
"incomplete". The movie graph argument is flawed.
I'm not sure what that means, that comp is incomplete. You either
start from the assumption that your consciousness can be faithfully
preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant, or you don't. What am
I admit I haven't followed all of the list postings lately, but I
haven't seen a coherent explanation of why the movie graph argument is
flawed... if I missed it, can you point me to where this was
I have no problem at all with the idea that my "consciousness can
be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant" so long
as functional equivalence is exactly maintained. But the MGA seems to
neglect the very real possibility that consciousness seems to depend on
things that don't happen just as much as it depends on things that do
happen. Maudlin and Bruno are effectively arguing that "things that
don't happen" are thus irrelevant and should and even must be dismissed
in considering consciousness. We are being sold a bill of goods if we
continue to thing in terms of classical logic that does not look at both
sides of a set (the members, boundary and the set's complement) as
involved in a function.
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