On Thursday, September 20, 2012 9:49:58 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> On 9/20/2012 12:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Thursday, September 20, 2012 7:19:30 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>> Consciousness requires an autonomous self.
> Human consciousness requires an autonomous human self, but it is not
> necessarily true that consciousness requires a 'self'. It makes more sense
> to say that an autonomous self and consciousness both require awareness.
> What if awareness is what happens when autonomous self and
> consciousness mirror each other?
There can't be an autonomous self without awareness as an ontological given
to begin with, at least as an inevitable potential. What would a self be or
do without awareness? You can have awareness without a self being presented
within that awareness though. I've had dreams where there is no "I" there
are just scenes that are taking place.
>> So does life itself. And intelligence.
> We don't really know that. We can only speak for our own life and our own
> intelligence. I wouldn't presume a self, especially on low levels of
> awareness like molecular groupings.
>> So, I hagte to say this, but perhaps consciousness and life may be a
>> problem with mereology, don't know.
> Why is it a problem. Mereology is the public presentation of life, and the
> private presentation is the opposite: non-mereology.
> Huh? non-mereology. What is that?
I call it a-mereology also. That's the subjective conjugate to topology. In
public realism there is the Stone Duality ( topologies ┴ logical algebras)
while the private phenomenology duality is orthogonal to the Stone
(a-mereology ┴ transrational gestalt-algebra).
I posted about it a bit yesterday:
Our feeling of hurting is a (whole) experience of human reality, so that it
> is not composed of sub-personal experiences in a part-whole mereological
> relation but rather the relation is just the opposite. It is
> non-mereological or a-mereological. It is the primordial
> semi-unity/hyper-unity from which part-whole distinctions are extracted and
> projected outward as classical realism of an exterior world. I know that
> sounds dense and crazy, but I don’t know of a clearer way to describe it.
> Subjective experience is augmented along an axis of quality rather than
> quantity. Experiences of hurting capitulate sub personal experiences of
> emotional loss and disappointment, anger, and fear, with tactile sensations
> of throbbing, stabbing, burning, and cognitive feedback loops of worry,
> impatience, exaggerating and replaying the injury or illness, memories of
> associated experiences, etc. But we can just say ‘hurting’ and we all know
> generally what that means. No more particular description adds much to it.
> That is completely unlike exterior realism, where all we can see of a
> machine hurting would be that more processing power would seem to be
> devoted to some particular set of computations. They don’t run ‘all
> together and at once’, unless there is a living being who is there to
> interpret it that way - as we do when we look at a screen full of
> individual pixels and see images through the pixels rather than the
> changing pixels themselves.
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