On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:59, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

You could be right, but as I see it,
organizing and focusing all of that complex network
of nerves and their signals into a singular mental point would
--to my mind at least--  be done by a singular intelligent agent.

No problem, the person is a singular agent, from his/her/it perspective.

Of course, with QM or comp, this becomes false from the 3p, or the 0p perspective, but this concerns more appearances of bodies than person.




A self, in other words.


All machine have a singular self, having nameable and non nameable facets. And Löbian machine, that is those who have the cognitive ability to know that they are (Turing) universal, knows that, at least as far as they trust their own consistency or correctness.



And an intelligent self
would act out of a center, which does the choosing,
in ideal space or in real space.

This is fuzzy, and can have many different interpretations in comp or QM.




Call it a central processing unit if you prefer computer language.

That would be misleading, and close to Searle type of error. The self is a higher level program, most plausibly, distributed in a sort of holographic way in the whole brain, with the reflexive self probably maintained in the cortex. Brains, like robots swarm, don't have a central processing unit. Selves needs only higher level integrated functions.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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Time: 2012-09-20, 07:33:10
Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant




On 20 Sep 2012, at 12:03, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Jason Resch


Pragmatically speaking, the self has to be a singular, focussed point.
I have trouble understanding how that can be done with a network of nerve signals.


The semantic of all programs, like the so called denotational semantics, involves abstract points in abstract space. We don't need physical or geometrical points as consciousness is related to the abstract emulation. You should not reduce a person to the network of its nerves, as the person is an immaterial entity, only using its brain, like you are using a computer right now.


It might help you to understand that weak materialism (the doctrine asserting the existence of primitive substance) is not compatible with computationalism, so your network of nerves is mainly a fictitious way to describe the brain as an object. You are using a physical supervenience thesis which simply can't work once we assume comp (and don't throw consciousness in the trash).


Bruno











Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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Time: 2012-09-19, 11:51:00
Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant


On Sep 19, 2012, at 8:02 AM, "Roger Clough"  wrote:

Hi Jason Resch

My ionterpretation of the result of the brain splitting on
pain perception is that her "self" is on one side and
the feeling of pain is on the other. Thus she feels the pain,
but cannot associate to her self (doesn't care).


I would agree, but add that the self, in this case, is found in the
connected parts of the majority of her brain.

Jason



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/19/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31
Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant




On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding
what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and
dysfunctional.


You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i
think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight
appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of
their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes,
like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the
language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of
the brain that talks says it can't see.

I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain
but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the
conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there
another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care?




Brent,


Good question, and a scary thought.


I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but
correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected)
part of the brain is.


Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming
isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut
off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have
no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions.


Jason


Brent

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