Hi Stephen P. King I have trouble conceiving an isomorphism (or anything comparative) between something that is there and something that is not. The something that is not there is not the absence of the thing that was, since it has no shape, no location, and cannot be found by a physical search.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-22, 16:03:48 Subject: Re: On Causation with Mind and brain as apples and oranges On 9/22/2012 6:11 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Craig Weinberg > > OK that's the classic example of the pin prick and feeling pain. > > It works for the worlds of apples and oranges if you accept > Hume's and Leibniz's theory of causation, or at least my understanding of it, > namely that changes in the mental world are simply synchronized > with changes in the physical world and vice versa. Dear Roger, The relation between the extended and non-extended is immediate and thus must be some form of isomorphism. I porpose the Stone Duality to be a valid and faithful representation of this isomorphism, following the suggestion by Pratt. The "coordination" of events of the body and states of the mind are successive alignments that we can either case into a global explanatory scheme, such as a PEN, or we can assume some Humean classical model. Perhaps both Hume and Leibniz where looking at the problem from opposite sides of a spectrum and each only seeing the pole. If We start with the consistent idea of a monad, as defined, and then consider what it means to have a coordination between the extended and non-extended aspects, we notice that these can be recast into an "inside" v. "outside" relation. It was Descartes that failed to see that the problem is not explanation of the interaction between the mental and the physical, it is the problem of explanation of how bodies (minds) interact with other bodies (minds). Bruno has shown that it is possible to almost completely capture the relational scheme needed for minds within a framework of modal logic. He shows that all that is left is the explanation of what is a body. Newton et al, have given us a wonderful account of the schemata of the body but left unresolved the nature and necessity of the mind. What if both of these schemata are just restatements of the Polarity between what Leibniz and Hume considered as a problem of causality? > > Given that, to see if an action is "caused" either by mental or physical > powers you simply look at the near-future mental > or physical situation. Monads allow you to do that. Don't conflate them. Think of the "causality " of each as contravariant, as "going in opposite directions". Monads can solve this if we understand that they have dual aspects. Mental aspects are such that their causation is "logical entailment" and this "looks back onto precedent" so as to not allow any state that would contradict any previous state. Physical aspects are causal in the usual understood sense of events causing other events in a temporal progression. > In that future state both the mental and physical situations > will have changed. No! That would allow contradictions, and thus "White Rabbits", to occur. The key is to understand that we cannot assume a global arrangement that imposes a ordering on the Many, ala a Pre-Established Harmony. We have to allow for novelty and choice. We can achieve this in an explanation, but we need to consider that we are, at the end of the day, considering finite worlds that have bounding horizons. > And anything changed can be considered > as being caused. That's the principle of sufficient reason. We agree. but all of the Principles must be applicable. We cannot cherry pick the applications of the Principles. There is the Identity of Indiscernibles to consider, and others... > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 9/22/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-09-21, 13:03:13 > Subject: Re: Mind and brain as apples and oranges > > > > > On Friday, September 21, 2012 11:48:34 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > Hi Stephen P. King and all > > The problems imagined by materialists in invoking dualism > are just that - imaginary-- as long as mind is unextended > and brain is extended. And the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness > and the cartesian problem of interfacing or superimposing > mind and brain simply vanish. They're apples and oranges. > They exist in different universes, which can superimpose, > the extended or physical "floating" in a sea of inextended > or nonphysical mind, or to use a better word, life. > > > But if I drink coffee (from the apples universe of extended stuff) then I get > amped (in the oranges universe if unextended mind). Why does that problem > disappear? > > Craig > > > > > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net > 9/21/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Stephen P. King > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-09-21, 11:04:59 > Subject: Re: Numbers in Space > > > On 9/21/2012 4:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> But the numbers build an "arithmetic body" >> >> The numbers arithmetically dream of a non arithmetic body. >> >> >>> and then populate a space with multiple copies of it... so that they >>> can "implement" the UD. >> >> No, they are implemented by the UD, which exists like prime numbers >> exists. Primitively. > So the dreams "exists like prime numbers exists. Primitively. " and > the dreams are of "a non arithmetic body", thus "a non arithmetic body" > exists primitively. How is this different from anything that I have > tried to tell you of my ideas? We agree!!!!!! This is "dual aspect" > monism! I used to call it process dualism, but realized that that > working caused too much confusion. > > > -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.