Hi Craig Weinberg 

Thwe ideal vacuum is still in spacetime.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/21/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 11:27:56
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space




On Friday, September 21, 2012 4:18:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

> Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp. 
> 
> If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of   
> physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal   
> machines using only empty space? 

You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space   
non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing   
universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is   
already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need   
three bodies at least). 



What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated 
bundles of lengths. No quantum. 



It would not be Turing universal.

If it isn't then that seems to me an argument for primitive physics. 
 












> Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or   
> Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and   
> multiplication and directly program from our mind to space? 

Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to   
handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.  


Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.   
Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic. 


I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about 
should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain.


Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and multiplication of 
integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda terms, etc.

I was going to do another post upping the ante from Numbers in Space to Numbers 
in Xpace (imaginary space). To me this is the fading qualia argument that could 
be a Waterloo for comp. The transition from Turing machines executed in matter 
to execution in space and then xpace would have to be consistent to support the 
claim that arithmetic is independent from physics. If that isn't the case, why 
not? What is different other than physical properties between matter, space, 
and xpace?
 







I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories 
there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space. 


Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your 
memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence possible. 
This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and that is what is 
done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*.

I don't know what that means exactly but if I am getting the gist, it still 
doesn't tell me why it is easier for me to remember something in my mind than 
to offload my memories onto objects, places, times of the year, whatever. Why 
not make a Turing machine out of time that uses moments instead of tape and 
tape instead of numbers? It seems to me that the universality of UMs is wildly 
overstated. 








That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, 
revolving sun, etc.

So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no 
resources whatsoever besides space, 


No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp.

So we can pretty much call comp magic then. It needs nothing whatsoever and can 
ultimately control anything from anywhere.
 







provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand 
why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?)



By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material hypostases". Up 
to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the reason why destructive 
interference of the computations occurs below our substitution level.

Why doesn't anything arithmetic need to be justified with "computational 
hypostases"?

Craig
 



Bruno










> 
> Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be   
> constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute   
> position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but   
> that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to   
> directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us   
> access to the results of the computations. 

? 


I mean if I could stand completely still then the planet would fly off from 
under my feet and I would be left standing exactly where I was with the Earth 
revolving past me at 107,000 km/hr. I would occupy the same space while the 
Earth, Sun, and galaxy sweep away from me.

If instead of me, it was memories I had stashed away in space, then my body 
would be soon separated from the absolute position that I had placed them. It 
shouldn't matter though, since by the same method of thinking numbers into 
space, I should be able to retrieve them too, regardless of the distance 
between my body and the numbers.




> 
> What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory   
> be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally   
> prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the   
> computations of silicon? 

Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with   
universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp,   
the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number   
"dreams" statistics. 


So you are saying yes to the space doctor?
 


The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason   
clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem   
mathematically. 


I don't question that, and I think that it may ultimately be the only way of 
engineering mind body solutions - but I still think that if we really want to 
know the truth about mind body, we can only find that in the un-numbered, 
un-named meta-juxtapostions of experienced sense.
 


And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving   
the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge   
people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood,   
or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course. 


I can behave respectfully to a puppet too, but I feel hypocritical because I 
wouldn't change places with them for any reason. 


Bruno 



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 






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