On Friday, September 21, 2012 11:51:10 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Hi Craig Weinberg > > Thwe ideal vacuum is still in spacetime. >
It's in ideal spacetime. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] <javascript:> > 9/21/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2012-09-21, 11:27:56 > *Subject:* Re: Numbers in Space > > > > On Friday, September 21, 2012 4:18:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> > Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp. >>> > >>> > If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of >>> > physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal >>> > machines using only empty space? >>> >>> You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space >>> non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing >>> universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is >>> already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need >>> three bodies at least). >>> >>> >> What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding >> enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum. >> >> >> It would not be Turing universal. >> > > If it isn't then that seems to me an argument for primitive physics. > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> > Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or >>> > Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and >>> > multiplication and directly program from our mind to space? >>> >>> Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to >>> handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length. >>> >> >>> Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum. >>> Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic. >>> >> >> I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think >> about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the >> brain. >> >> >> Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and >> multiplication of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda >> terms, etc. >> > > I was going to do another post upping the ante from Numbers in Space to > Numbers in Xpace (imaginary space). To me this is the fading qualia > argument that could be a Waterloo for comp. The transition from Turing > machines executed in matter to execution in space and then xpace would have > to be consistent to support the claim that arithmetic is independent from > physics. If that isn't the case, why not? What is different other than > physical properties between matter, space, and xpace? > > >> >> >> >> I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of >> memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same >> space. >> >> >> Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your >> memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence >> possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and >> that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*. >> > > I don't know what that means exactly but if I am getting the gist, it > still doesn't tell me why it is easier for me to remember something in my > mind than to offload my memories onto objects, places, times of the year, > whatever. Why not make a Turing machine out of time that uses moments > instead of tape and tape instead of numbers? It seems to me that the > universality of UMs is wildly overstated. > > >> >> >> That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating >> planet, revolving sun, etc. >> >> So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no >> resources whatsoever besides space, >> >> >> No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp. >> > > So we can pretty much call comp magic then. It needs nothing whatsoever > and can ultimately control anything from anywhere. > > >> >> >> >> provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't >> understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter >> or space?) >> >> >> By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material >> hypostases". Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the >> reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our >> substitution level. >> > > Why doesn't anything arithmetic need to be justified with "computational > hypostases"? > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> > >>> > Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be >>> > constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute >>> > position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but >>> > that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to >>> > directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us >>> > access to the results of the computations. >>> >>> ? >>> >> >> I mean if I could stand completely still then the planet would fly off >> from under my feet and I would be left standing exactly where I was with >> the Earth revolving past me at 107,000 km/hr. I would occupy the same space >> while the Earth, Sun, and galaxy sweep away from me. >> >> If instead of me, it was memories I had stashed away in space, then my >> body would be soon separated from the absolute position that I had placed >> them. It shouldn't matter though, since by the same method of thinking >> numbers into space, I should be able to retrieve them too, regardless of >> the distance between my body and the numbers. >> >> >>> >>> > >>> > What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory >>> > be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally >>> > prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the >>> > computations of silicon? >>> >>> Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with >>> universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp, >>> the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number >>> "dreams" statistics. >>> >> >> So you are saying yes to the space doctor? >> >> >>> >>> The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason >>> clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem >>> mathematically. >>> >> >> I don't question that, and I think that it may ultimately be the only way >> of engineering mind body solutions - but I still think that if we really >> want to know the truth about mind body, we can only find that in the >> un-numbered, un-named meta-juxtapostions of experienced sense. >> >> >>> >>> And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving >>> the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge >>> people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood, >>> or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course. >>> >> >> I can behave respectfully to a puppet too, but I feel hypocritical >> because I wouldn't change places with them for any reason. >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/BUBSbCUjtbgJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/X2XXBwCB-ycJ. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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