On Friday, September 21, 2012 11:51:10 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Craig Weinberg 
>  
> Thwe ideal vacuum is still in spacetime.
>

It's in ideal spacetime.
 

>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:>
> 9/21/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>  
>  
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2012-09-21, 11:27:56
> *Subject:* Re: Numbers in Space
>
>  
>
> On Friday, September 21, 2012 4:18:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>>  On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>
>>> > Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp. 
>>> > 
>>> > If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of   
>>> > physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal   
>>> > machines using only empty space? 
>>>
>>> You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space   
>>> non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing   
>>> universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is   
>>> already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need   
>>> three bodies at least). 
>>>
>>>
>> What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding 
>> enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum. 
>>
>>
>> It would not be Turing universal.
>>
>
> If it isn't then that seems to me an argument for primitive physics. 
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>
>>  
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or   
>>> > Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and   
>>> > multiplication and directly program from our mind to space? 
>>>
>>> Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to   
>>> handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.  
>>>
>>
>>> Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.   
>>> Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic. 
>>>
>>
>> I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think 
>> about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the 
>> brain.
>>
>>
>> Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and 
>> multiplication of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda 
>> terms, etc.
>>
>
> I was going to do another post upping the ante from Numbers in Space to 
> Numbers in Xpace (imaginary space). To me this is the fading qualia 
> argument that could be a Waterloo for comp. The transition from Turing 
> machines executed in matter to execution in space and then xpace would have 
> to be consistent to support the claim that arithmetic is independent from 
> physics. If that isn't the case, why not? What is different other than 
> physical properties between matter, space, and xpace?
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>
>>  I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of 
>> memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same 
>> space. 
>>
>>
>> Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your 
>> memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence 
>> possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and 
>> that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*.
>>
>
> I don't know what that means exactly but if I am getting the gist, it 
> still doesn't tell me why it is easier for me to remember something in my 
> mind than to offload my memories onto objects, places, times of the year, 
> whatever. Why not make a Turing machine out of time that uses moments 
> instead of tape and tape instead of numbers? It seems to me that the 
> universality of UMs is wildly overstated. 
>
>   
>>
>>
>>  That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating 
>> planet, revolving sun, etc.
>>
>> So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no 
>> resources whatsoever besides space, 
>>
>>
>> No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp.
>>
>
> So we can pretty much call comp magic then. It needs nothing whatsoever 
> and can ultimately control anything from anywhere.
>  
>
>>  
>>
>>
>>  provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't 
>> understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter 
>> or space?)
>>
>>
>> By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material 
>> hypostases". Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the 
>> reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our 
>> substitution level.
>>
>
> Why doesn't anything arithmetic need to be justified with "computational 
> hypostases"?
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>  
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be   
>>> > constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute   
>>> > position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but   
>>> > that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to   
>>> > directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us   
>>> > access to the results of the computations. 
>>>
>>> ? 
>>>
>>
>> I mean if I could stand completely still then the planet would fly off 
>> from under my feet and I would be left standing exactly where I was with 
>> the Earth revolving past me at 107,000 km/hr. I would occupy the same space 
>> while the Earth, Sun, and galaxy sweep away from me.
>>
>> If instead of me, it was memories I had stashed away in space, then my 
>> body would be soon separated from the absolute position that I had placed 
>> them. It shouldn't matter though, since by the same method of thinking 
>> numbers into space, I should be able to retrieve them too, regardless of 
>> the distance between my body and the numbers.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory   
>>> > be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally   
>>> > prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the   
>>> > computations of silicon? 
>>>
>>> Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with   
>>> universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp,   
>>> the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number   
>>> "dreams" statistics. 
>>>
>>
>> So you are saying yes to the space doctor?
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason   
>>> clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem   
>>> mathematically. 
>>>
>>
>> I don't question that, and I think that it may ultimately be the only way 
>> of engineering mind body solutions - but I still think that if we really 
>> want to know the truth about mind body, we can only find that in the 
>> un-numbered, un-named meta-juxtapostions of experienced sense.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving   
>>> the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge   
>>> people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood,   
>>> or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course. 
>>>
>>
>> I can behave respectfully to a puppet too, but I feel hypocritical 
>> because I wouldn't change places with them for any reason. 
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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