Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view:

1)  Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined 
in the following way:  if the monad sees the appetite,
then the action is free will. If not, not.

2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, it 
is a "fulgeration" of the All (the monad of monads),
to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. 
Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads,
nor in fact is the All. L's causation is cooperative.
The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only
do so according to the monads' perceptions, according 
to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected
by other monads. All changes in monads are actually
caused by their previous states. Since this must occur
according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down
to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for
monadic change. Like the prices of stock market stocks,
it contains all you need or can know to predict
the future states of all monads, those being individually 
given by their previous states. Since the previous states have
been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything
in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/28/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) 


On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 

> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote: 
> 
>> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".  
>> This has 
>> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding  
>> ability (by 
>> G?el "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency"  
>> is pure 
>> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the  
>> machine will 
>> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its 
>> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can  
>> be aware 
>> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be  
>> aware of its 
>> non communicability, making it into a personal quale. 
>> 
>> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and 
>> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago  
>> you did 
>> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of  
>> brain and 
>> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another  
>> role for 
>> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number  
>> relations 
>> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes  
>> notions of 
>> causal efficacy meaningful to start with. 
> 
> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 

But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your  
brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well  
defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some  
precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain  
at all. 

Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes,  
with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a  
role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked  
by Craig. 





> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> possible but it is contrary to all science. 

I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point  
is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as  
it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal  
matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp  
matter" and the QM matter. 



> This applies even if the 
> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> at the level of the simulation. 

Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution  
level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many  
possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current  
computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a  
posteriori. 
In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same  
way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized  
state (like I am in this well defined city). 

Bruno 




> 
>> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-  
>> will. This 
>> would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level,  
>> but we are 
>> not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we  
>> live, and 
>> unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer  
>> god", not 
>> the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-  
>> consistency, and 
>> cannot know its local future. 
> 
> 
> --  
> Stathis Papaioannou 
> 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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