On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:


It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!

On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can know its exact impulsion too, even if this will make me totally ignorant of its position.

But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a definite position and momentum; only that you cannot prepare an ensemble in which both values are sharp.

OK. This Fourier relation between complementary observable is quite mysterious in the comp theory.

How about that! Bruno, you might wish to read up a little on Pontryagin duality, of which the Fourier relation is an example. It is a relation between spaces. How do you get spaces in your non-theory, Bruno?


The result is that we have to explain geometry, analysis and physics from numbers. It is constructive as it shows the unique method which keeps distinct and relate the different views, and the quanta/qualia differences. But the result is a problem, indeed: a problem in intensional arithmetic.
Hi Bruno,

What ever means they are constructed, it is still a space that is the end result. A space is simply "a*space*is aset <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_%28mathematics%29>with some addedstructure <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_structure>."

In both case, the electron participate two different coherent computation leading to my computational state. Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms.

But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some definite representation in each of infinitely many computations. The uncertainty comes from the many different computations. Right?

Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp indeterminacy.

Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical world.

Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world without assuming a *primitive* physical world.

I am OK with the idea that a physical world is that which can be described by a Boolean Algebra in a "sharable way". The trick is the "sharing". It order to share something there must be multiple entities that can each participate in some way and that those entities are in some way distinguishable from each other.

This is defined as "centering" by Quine's /Propositional Objects/ <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40103900?uid=3739776&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101089247673> as discussed in Chalmers book, pg. 60-61...

The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation. It is not well defined below your substitution level, but this is only due to your ignorance on which computations you belong.

Right. What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a classical state (since I don't experience Everett's many worlds).

But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. "

How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"? I thought your theory was that both at made by computations. My intuition is that, within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of matter and matter is a construct of consciousness;

That's what I was saying.



I believe that it was Brent that wrote: "My intuition is that, within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of matter and matter is a construct of consciousness; " and you wrote that you agreed.

so you can't have one without the other.

Exactly. Not sure if we disagree on something here.

What exactly are you agreeing about, Bruno? No consciousness without matter? Ah, you think that numbers have intrinsic properties... OK.

Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible realities.

It is not a reality in a world that only has 16 objects in it. I can come up with several other counter-examples in terms of finite field, but that is overly belaboring a point.

This is needed to define in an intrinsic way the non intrinsic, intensional properties of the relative number (machines). Being universal, or simply being a code, or an address is not intrinsic, but can be once we choose an initial Turing universal base.

How do you distinguish one version of the code X from another Y such that X interviews Y has a meaning?





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