On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have
been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even
if this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can
know its exact impulsion too, even if this will make me totally
ignorant of its position.
But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a definite
position and momentum; only that you cannot prepare an ensemble in
which both values are sharp.
OK. This Fourier relation between complementary observable is quite
mysterious in the comp theory.
How about that! Bruno, you might wish to read up a little on
Pontryagin duality, of which the Fourier relation is an example. It
is a relation between spaces. How do you get spaces in your
The result is that we have to explain geometry, analysis and physics
from numbers. It is constructive as it shows the unique method which
keeps distinct and relate the different views, and the quanta/qualia
differences. But the result is a problem, indeed: a problem in
What ever means they are constructed, it is still a space that is
the end result. A space is simply "a*space*is aset
In both case, the electron participate two different coherent
computation leading to my computational state.
Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical
QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms.
But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some
definite representation in each of infinitely many computations.
The uncertainty comes from the many different computations. Right?
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and
now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first person
Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical
Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world
without assuming a *primitive* physical world.
I am OK with the idea that a physical world is that which can be
described by a Boolean Algebra in a "sharable way". The trick is the
"sharing". It order to share something there must be multiple entities
that can each participate in some way and that those entities are in
some way distinguishable from each other.
This is defined as "centering" by Quine's /Propositional Objects/
as discussed in Chalmers book, pg. 60-61...
The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation.
It is not well defined below your substitution level, but this is
only due to your ignorance on which computations you belong.
Right. What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a
classical state (since I don't experience Everett's many worlds).
But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your brain,
at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined
state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise
position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. "
How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"? I thought
your theory was that both at made by computations. My intuition is
that, within your theory of comp, consciousness implies
consciousness of matter and matter is a construct of consciousness;
That's what I was saying.
I believe that it was Brent that wrote: "My intuition is that,
within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of
matter and matter is a construct of consciousness; " and you wrote that
so you can't have one without the other.
Exactly. Not sure if we disagree on something here.
What exactly are you agreeing about, Bruno? No consciousness
without matter? Ah, you think that numbers have intrinsic
Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible
It is not a reality in a world that only has 16 objects in it. I
can come up with several other counter-examples in terms of finite
field, but that is overly belaboring a point.
This is needed to define in an intrinsic way the non intrinsic,
intensional properties of the relative number (machines). Being
universal, or simply being a code, or an address is not intrinsic, but
can be once we choose an initial Turing universal base.
How do you distinguish one version of the code X from another Y
such that X interviews Y has a meaning?
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