On 30 Sep 2012, at 01:54, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I
have been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain,
even if this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I
can know its exact impulsion too, even if this will make me
totally ignorant of its position.
But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a
definite position and momentum; only that you cannot prepare an
ensemble in which both values are sharp.
OK. This Fourier relation between complementary observable is
quite mysterious in the comp theory.
How about that! Bruno, you might wish to read up a little on
Pontryagin duality, of which the Fourier relation is an example.
It is a relation between spaces. How do you get spaces in your non-
The result is that we have to explain geometry, analysis and
physics from numbers. It is constructive as it shows the unique
method which keeps distinct and relate the different views, and the
quanta/qualia differences. But the result is a problem, indeed: a
problem in intensional arithmetic.
What ever means they are constructed, it is still a space that
is the end result. A space is simply "a space is a set with some
A set is an epistemic construct, in the arithmetical TOE.
In both case, the electron participate two different coherent
computation leading to my computational state.
Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous
classical QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable
But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some
definite representation in each of infinitely many
computations. The uncertainty comes from the many different
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here
and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first
person comp indeterminacy.
Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a
Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world
without assuming a *primitive* physical world.
I am OK with the idea that a physical world is that which can be
described by a Boolean Algebra in a "sharable way". The trick is the
"sharing". It order to share something there must be multiple
entities that can each participate in some way and that those
entities are in some way distinguishable from each other.
Like they obviously are in arithmetic.
This is defined as "centering" by Quine's Propositional Objects as
discussed in Chalmers book, pg. 60-61...
The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a
computation. It is not well defined below your substitution
level, but this is only due to your ignorance on which
computations you belong.
Right. What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a
classical state (since I don't experience Everett's many worlds).
But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your
brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some
well defined state, with an electron, for example, described
with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no
"material" brain at all. "
How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"? I
thought your theory was that both at made by computations. My
intuition is that, within your theory of comp, consciousness
implies consciousness of matter and matter is a construct of
That's what I was saying.
I believe that it was Brent that wrote: "My intuition is that,
within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of
matter and matter is a construct of consciousness; " and you wrote
that you agreed.
so you can't have one without the other.
Exactly. Not sure if we disagree on something here.
What exactly are you agreeing about, Bruno? No consciousness
without matter? Ah, you think that numbers have intrinsic
Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible
It is not a reality in a world that only has 16 objects in it.
That would be ultrafinist, to say the least. But even this cannot
work, even in a world with only 16 objects, in the case it can have
self aware creature, by the MGA, in case comp can make sense in such
structure (which of course it does not).
I can come up with several other counter-examples in terms of finite
field, but that is overly belaboring a point.
Yes, and comp has to assume 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... to provide sense to
the term "computations".
This is needed to define in an intrinsic way the non intrinsic,
intensional properties of the relative number (machines). Being
universal, or simply being a code, or an address is not intrinsic,
but can be once we choose an initial Turing universal base.
How do you distinguish one version of the code X from another Y
such that X interviews Y has a meaning?
Like I distinguish factorial of 4 and factorial of 5.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at