On 30 Sep 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/30/2012 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Sep 2012, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp indeterminacy.

Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical world.

Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world without assuming a *primitive* physical world.

Physical objects are exactly the kind of thing that are defined ostensively.

They are referred too ostensively. They are not "defined" in that way, at least not in the theory.

Well of course, nothing can be referred to ostensively *in a theory*. But that's how theoretical definitions are given meaning via reference to what we perceive.

Sure. But the meaning can be clean from metaphysical prejudices also.

Only in practice, they referred too ostensively. In our context, we search a theory, not a practice.

A theory that can't be connected to practice is just abstract mathematics, a kind of language game.

I can' agree more, and that is why I criticize physicalism (not physics), as it cut the possible link between conscious practice and theory. Keep in my that my goal is to explain the origin of matter and consciousness.

In fact you do connect your theory to practice by reference to diaries and perceptions.

Absolutely so.
But I use the "yes doctor" practice, to still illustrate a conceptual point, which is that if comp is true, the mind is basically solved by the "dreams of the universal numbers", and matter is an open problem, as we have only the dreams and the persistence of laws might seem more difficult. The math just shows that the more we try to refute comp by that problem, the more we get a quantum like weirdness, making perhaps the quantum aspect of nature a reflect of our universal number dreamy nature.



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