HEY!
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have
been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if
this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can know its
exact impulsion too, even if this will make me totally ignorant of
its position.
But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a definite
position and momentum; only that you cannot prepare an ensemble in
which both values are sharp.
OK. This Fourier relation between complementary observable is quite
mysterious in the comp theory.
How about that! Bruno, you might wish to read up a little on
Pontryagin duality, of which the Fourier relation is an example. It is a
relation between spaces. How do you get spaces in your non-theory, Bruno?
In both case, the electron participate two different coherent
computation leading to my computational state.
Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical
QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms.
But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some
definite representation in each of infinitely many computations. The
uncertainty comes from the many different computations. Right?
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and
now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp
indeterminacy.
Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical
world. This is defined as "centering" by Quine's /Propositional Objects/
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40103900?uid=3739776&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101089247673>
as discussed in Chalmers book, pg. 60-61...
The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation.
It is not well defined below your substitution level, but this is
only due to your ignorance on which computations you belong.
Right. What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a classical
state (since I don't experience Everett's many worlds).
But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your brain, at
the level below the substitution level, having some well defined
state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise
position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. "
How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"? I thought
your theory was that both at made by computations. My intuition is
that, within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness
of matter and matter is a construct of consciousness;
That's what I was saying.
Really!?
so you can't have one without the other.
Exactly. Not sure if we disagree on something here.
What exactly are you agreeing about, Bruno? No consciousness
without matter? Ah, you think that numbers have intrinsic properties... OK.
Bruno
Brent
You can "observe" yourself below the substitution result, but the
detail of such observation are just not relevant for getting your
computational state.
Bruno
Brent
Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already
describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is
still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly
magical role invoked by Craig.
Craig is not invoking any magic other than the fact that
consciousness cannot be striped from what allows it to define itself and
remain the same thing. It has content and that content is important. It
is not just a hall of mirrors effect that we can collapse with Kleene.
No, there is a physical tie in that cannot be ignored.
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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