Hi Stephen P. King  

Leibniz would not go along with epiphenomena because
the matter that materialists base their beliefs in
is not real, so it can't emanate consciousness.

Leibniz did not believe in matter in the same way that
atheists today do not believe in God.  

And with good reason. Leibniz contended that not only matter,
but spacetime itself (or any extended substance) could not 
real because extended substances are infinitely divisible. 

Personally. I substitute Heisenberg's uncertainty principle
as the basis for this view because the fundamental particles
are supposedly divisible. Or one might substitute
Einstein's principle of the relativity of spacetime.
The uncertainties left with us by Heisenberg on
the small scale and Einstein on the large scale
ought to cause materialists to base their beliefs on
something less elusive than matter.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-29, 19:54:56 
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism 

On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 


    It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have been 
complaining about. Thank you, Brent! 

On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if this will 
make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can know its exact impulsion too, 
even if this will make me totally ignorant of its position.  

But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a definite position and 
momentum; only that you cannot prepare an ensemble in which both values are 

OK. This Fourier relation between complementary observable is quite mysterious 
in the comp theory.  

    How about that! Bruno, you might wish to read up a little on Pontryagin 
duality, of which the Fourier relation is an example. It is a relation between 
spaces. How do you get spaces in your non-theory, Bruno? 


The result is that we have to explain geometry, analysis and physics from 
numbers. It is constructive as it shows the unique method which keeps distinct 
and relate the different views, and the quanta/qualia differences. But the 
result is a problem, indeed: a problem in intensional arithmetic. 
Hi Bruno, 

    What ever means they are constructed, it is still a space that is the end 
result. A space is simply "a space is a set with some added structure." 

In both case, the electron participate two different coherent computation 
leading to my computational state.  
Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical QM, we need 
to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms.  

But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some definite 
representation in each of infinitely many computations.  The uncertainty comes 
from the many different computations.  Right?  

Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and now". The QM 
indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp indeterminacy.  

    Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical world.  

Perhaps, but you need to define what you mean by physical world without 
assuming a *primitive* physical world. 

    I am OK with the idea that a physical world is that which can be described 
by a Boolean Algebra in a "sharable way". The trick is the "sharing". It order 
to share something there must be multiple entities that can each participate in 
some way and that those entities are in some way distinguishable from each 

This is defined as "centering" by Quine's Propositional Objects as discussed in 
Chalmers book, pg. 60-61... 

The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation. It is not 
well defined below your substitution level, but this is only due to your 
ignorance on which computations you belong.  

Right.  What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a classical state 
(since I don't experience Everett's many worlds).  

But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your brain, at the level 
below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, 
for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there 
is no "material" brain at all. "  

How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"?  I thought your theory 
was that both at made by computations.  My intuition is that, within your 
theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of matter and matter is a 
construct of consciousness;  

That's what I was saying.  



    I believe that it was Brent that wrote: "My intuition is that, within your 
theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of matter and matter is a 
construct of consciousness; " and you wrote that you agreed. 

so you can't have one without the other.  

Exactly. Not sure if we disagree on something here.  

    What exactly are you agreeing about, Bruno? No consciousness without 
matter? Ah, you think that numbers have intrinsic properties... OK.  

Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible realities. 

    It is not a reality in a world that only has 16 objects in it. I can come 
up with several other counter-examples in terms of finite field, but that is 
overly belaboring a point. 

This is needed to define in an intrinsic way the non intrinsic, intensional 
properties of the relative number (machines). Being universal, or simply being 
a code, or an address is not intrinsic, but can be once we choose an initial 
Turing universal base. 

    How do you distinguish one version of the code X from another Y such that X 
interviews Y has a meaning? 





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