Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
Craig On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex > computations ? > > The short answer is that I am proposing that : > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these > halted upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough > mathematics to be more specific. > > If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. > > > > > ======================================================= > A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: > Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent > property" > of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: > > A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's > condition of non-computability ? > > http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html > > "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property > of classical > computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. > The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that > > 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, > 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex > temporally bind information, > and > 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity > among neurons." > > > > B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? > > Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or > emerge through looking at a phenomenon > at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an > emergent property of > the behavior of many minds. > > IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser > position. > > Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: > > http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html > > One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably > that of Platonia as experienced. > All art and insight comes from such an experience. > > On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the > universe is made up of > quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex > entities. > He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong > to the realm > of spin networks. > > This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of > non-computability, > and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, > to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. > > Instead, I propose the following: > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough > mathematics to be more specific. > ================================================================= > > > > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:> > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
