On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?No!The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.No!2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity.No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno hasalready shown this!Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directedplatonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do notknow enoughmathematics to be more specific.Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is alsoavailable from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/"Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert itsown soundness without becoming inconsistent."

I get only "page not found". Bruno

A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradoxIf you would like a more complete discussion, read below.I will!======================================================= A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergentproperty"of computational complexity among neurons. This raises somequestions:A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name forPenrose's condition of non-computability ?http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergentproperty of classicalcomputer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mentalstates,2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortextemporally bind information,and3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computationalcomplexity among neurons."That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appearor emerge through looking at a phenomenonat a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology isan emergent property ofthe behavior of many minds.Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mindis only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement ofclosure under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theoremis all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can breakthe symmetry somehow!IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From awiser position.Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.htmlOne is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability,presumably that of Platonia as experienced.All art and insight comes from such an experience.No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position onPlatonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and getit straight from the Horse's mouth.http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: "In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect than the material world of our external experiences, but just as real."Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains tobe explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno'sCOMP program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believethat the universe is made up ofquantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the mostcomplex entities.He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculationsbelong to the realmof spin networks.The "physical universe" yes, he believes that... He has shownhow one can derive a crude version of space-time using spincombinatorials.This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.Not even wrong!Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.No!2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directedplatonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do notknow enoughmathematics to be more specific. =================================================================We must study the math, there are no short-cuts!Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ---- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.