Hi Craig Weinberg  

OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act.
And perhaps allow multiple options.  But how would your computerized
zombie know which option to take in any given situation ? 
I don't think options would be sophisticated enough to fool
anybody. But perhaps I am being too demanding.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/22/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-21, 16:53:03 
Subject: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p 




On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 


BRUNO:  Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it   
 
behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only    
God knows, if you want.  

ROGER: I  claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie  
that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO  that would  
be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know  
anything.  You would run into walls, for example, and  
couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc.  
You couldn't understand language.  



Roger I agree that your intuition is right - a philosophical zombie cannot 
exist in reality, but not for the reasons you are coming up with. Anything can 
be programmed to act like a human in some level of description. A scarecrow may 
act like a human in the eyes of a crow - well enough that it might be less 
likely to land nearby. You can make robots which won't run into walls or 
chatbots which respond to some range of vocabulary and sentence construction. 
The idea behind philosophical zombies is that we assume that there is nothing 
stopping us in theory from assembling all of the functions of a human being as 
a single machine, and that such a machine, it is thought, will either have the 
some kind of human-like experience or else it would have to have no experience. 

The absent qualia, fading qualia paper is about a thought experiment which 
tries to take the latter scenario seriously from the point of view of a person 
who is having their brain gradually taken over by these substitute sub-brain 
functional units. Would they see blue as being less and less blue as more of 
their brain is replaced, or would blue just suddenly disappear at some point? 
Each one seems absurd given that the sum of the remaining brain functions plus 
the sum of the replaced brain functions, must, by definition of the thought 
experiment, equal no change in observed behavior. 

This is my response to this thought experiment to Stathis: 

Stathis: In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the  
surrounding neurons in the same way as the original.  

Craig: Then the thought experiment is garbage from the start. It begs the 
question. Why not just say we can have an imitation human being that stimulates 
the surrounding human beings in the same way as the original? Ta-da! That makes 
it easy. Now all we need to do is make a human being that stimulates their 
social matrix in the same way as the original and we have perfect AI without 
messing with neurons or brains at all. Just make a whole person out of person 
stuff - like as a thought experiment suppose there is some stuff X which makes 
things that human beings think is another human being. Like marzipan. We can 
put the right pheromones in it and dress it up nice, and according to the 
thought experiment, let? say that works.  

You aren? allowed to deny this because then you don? understand the thought 
experiment, see? Don? you get it? You have to accept this flawed pretext to 
have a discussion that I will engage in now. See how it works? Now we can talk 
for six or eight months about how human marzipan is inevitable because it 
wouldn? make sense if you replaced a city gradually with marzipan people that 
New York would gradually fade into less of a New York or that New York becomes 
suddenly absent. It? a fallacy. The premise screws up the result. 

Craig 

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