On 25 Oct 2012, at 19:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia,
thoughts,...you need to start from something simpler that does not
assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well,
so he has to start without matter.
Actually I deduce the absence of matter from comp. If we bet on
comp, we have no other choice than to explain matter from dream
coherence notions. We can add matter, but it would be like
invisible horses, and vision is a first person experience and it
relies on the infinities of computation in arithmetic.
If you are with John Clark, and me, on comp, then you have to show
a flaw in UDA if you disagree with this. At least Clark tells us
where he stops in UDA (step 3, too bad nobody understands his
point, which seems an obvious confusion of 1 and 3-views).
I think you did follow the UDA up to step seven. Is it really the
step 8 which still makes problem? It is a bit more subtle, some
people have some difficulty there. Let us discuss them, or find
where we disagree at least.
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8,
then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I
think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually
infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it implicitly
requires a whole 'world';
Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the
conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if you
give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323 principle, so
that you attribute a functional role in a particular computation to
object having no physical activity for the actual computation.
which is why I suspect people, consciousness, etc. can only exist in
a world of matter (note that I'm not saying *primitive* ur-stuff)
that can embody the computation.
But then the consequences can follow. The UD computes all possible
couples subject-environments, including infinite environment (the
first person cannot distinguish an infinite environment with a
sequence of computations going through his state in bigger and bigger
environments. This is already used in step 7.
That you use it to conclude that no matter (not even secondary
matter) is needed is misleading.
Secondary matter can have a role, and certainly has a role, as the
"real" computations are using it. Our brains remains material, with
comp. The requirement is that such materiality is secondary on all
immaterial computations existing in arithmetic.
But I need to read it again.
MGA is not easy, and I am sure it can be improved.
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