On 25 Oct 2012, at 19:49, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Brent wrote:
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you need to start from something simpler that does not assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well, so he has to start without matter.

Actually I deduce the absence of matter from comp. If we bet on comp, we have no other choice than to explain matter from dream coherence notions. We can add matter, but it would be like invisible horses, and vision is a first person experience and it relies on the infinities of computation in arithmetic.

If you are with John Clark, and me, on comp, then you have to show a flaw in UDA if you disagree with this. At least Clark tells us where he stops in UDA (step 3, too bad nobody understands his point, which seems an obvious confusion of 1 and 3-views).

I think you did follow the UDA up to step seven. Is it really the step 8 which still makes problem? It is a bit more subtle, some people have some difficulty there. Let us discuss them, or find where we disagree at least.

Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.

What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world';

Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if you give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323 principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a particular computation to object having no physical activity for the actual computation.

which is why I suspect people, consciousness, etc. can only exist in a world of matter (note that I'm not saying *primitive* ur-stuff) that can embody the computation.

But then the consequences can follow. The UD computes all possible couples subject-environments, including infinite environment (the first person cannot distinguish an infinite environment with a sequence of computations going through his state in bigger and bigger environments. This is already used in step 7.

That you use it to conclude that no matter (not even secondary matter) is needed is misleading.

Secondary matter can have a role, and certainly has a role, as the "real" computations are using it. Our brains remains material, with comp. The requirement is that such materiality is secondary on all immaterial computations existing in arithmetic.

But I need to read it again.

MGA is not easy, and I am sure it can be improved.



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