On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323
principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/
step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can
elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually
infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it
implicitly requires a whole 'world';
Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the
conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if you
give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323 principle,
so that you attribute a functional role in a particular computation
to object having no physical activity for the actual computation.
But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world.
Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are emulated
in the UD, or in arithmetic. If the 323 principles does not hold for
them, it might mean that QM is the winning computation, but then you
have to explain this from arithmetic.
Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain? In
that case, my consciousness would not be invariant when the Q brain is
entirely simulated by a classical machine, and comp is made false.
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