On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Oct 2012, at 22:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


    On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:



    2012/10/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

        On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


        2012/10/22 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
        <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>>

            On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
            > Hi Rusell,
            >
            >     How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
            >
            > --
            > Onward!
            >
            > Stephen

            No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is 
that
            the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources), 
which
            gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.

        thatæ„€ the problem that I insist, has  a natural solution considering the
        computational needs of living beings under natural selection, without
        resorting to a everithing-theory of reality based of a UD algorithm, 
like
        the Schmidhuber one.

            --

        Dear Alberto,

            My suspicion is that there does *not* exist a single global 
computation
        of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that "natural 
selection" is a
        local computation between each being and its environment. We end up 
with a
        model where there are many computations occurring concurrently and 
there is
        no single computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a
        picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation 
running on a
        single computer except for a very trivial case (where the total 
universe is
        in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).

    Yes, that'`s also what I think. These computations are material, in the 
sense
    that they are subject to limitation of resources (nervous signal speeds, 
chemical
    equilibrion, diffusion of hormones etc. So the bias toward a low kolmogorov
    complexity of an habitable universe can be naturally deduced from that.

    Natural selection is the mechanism for making discoveries, individual life
    incorporate these discoveries, called adaptations. A cat that jump to catch 
a
    fish has not discovered the laws of newton, Instead, the evolution has 
found a
    way to modulate the force exerted by the muscles according with how long 
the jump
    must be, and depending on the weight of the cat (that is calibrated by 
playing at
    at the early age).

    But this technique depends on the lineality and continuity of the law of 
newton
    for short distances. If the law of newton were more complicated, that would 
not
    be possible. So a low complexity of the macroscopical laws permit a low
    complexity and a low use of resources of the living computers that deal with
    them, and a faster dsicovery of adaptations by natural selection. But that
    complexity has a upper limit; Lineality seems to be a requirement for the
    operation of natural selection in the search for adaptations.

    
http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html



    I kind of agree with all what you say here, and on the basic philosophy. 
But I
    think that what you describe admits a more general description, in which 
the laws
    of physics are themselves selected by a process similar but more general 
than
    evolution. It makes me think that life (and brains at some different level) 
is
    what happen when a universal system mirrors itself. A universal machine is a
    dynamical mirror, and life can develop once you put the dynamical mirror in 
front
    of itself (again a case of diagonalization). I think I follow your 
philosophy, but
    apply it in arithmetic and/or computer science.


I envision also a kind of selection of the mind over the matter , since the most basic notion of existence implies and observer, that is,a mind and a mind, in a universe where history has a meaning (that discard boltzmann brains) , and hold a kind of intelligence (since intelligence permits to make use of experience) impose very strong antropic restrictions not only in the nature of the phisical laws, as I said, but in the matematicity of them. With matematicity i mean a reuse of the same simple structures at different levels of reality. I mean that the most simple mathematical structures are more represented in the structure of reality than complicated ones, to minimize the complexity.

But aren't those all the same conclusions that would arise from assuming that mathematics and physical laws are our inventions for describing and reasoning about the world and they are simple because that makes them understandable; they reflect our limited cognitive ability to think about only a few things at a time. Notice that physics, as it has become more mathematical and abstract, has left more and more to contingency and the randomness of QM. So physicists no longer propose to answer, "Why are there just eight planets?" or "Why is there a Moon?"


    Now I am just afraid, to talk frankly, that it looks like you have a 
reductionist
    conception of numbers and machines, which does not take into account the 
discovery
    of the universal machine (by the Post-Church-Kleene-Turing thesis) which 
makes you
    miss that your philosophy might be the natural philosophy of all universal
    numbers. (I probably exaggerate my point for attempt to be short).

I do not discard your point of view. the difference is that I go the easy path, from inside to outside, in a cartesian process, may call it, So my interest is centered not in a simple production principle, and explain the human experience from it, but to go from consciousness (with some leaps of faith) out to ascertain the nature of what is known with the aid of some hopefully testable hypotheses. To go in the opposite direction i need a kind of understanding and inspiration that I donæ„’ have. I perhaps need a kind of leap in imagination to see the big picture, but my natural selectionist bias force me to think that there would be no intellgence without purpose, and no purpose without environmnetal pressure, that is impossible without an environment, and a environment impossible without a preexistent matter, with preexistent laws. So a universal machine seems to me the inmaterial equivalent of a boltzman brain, made with no purpose, for no purpose and this devoid of meaning, with little to understand about it...

If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you need to start from something simpler that does not assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter as well, so he has to start without matter.

Actually I deduce the absence of matter from comp. If we bet on comp, we have no other choice than to explain matter from dream coherence notions. We can add matter, but it would be like invisible horses, and vision is a first person experience and it relies on the infinities of computation in arithmetic.

If you are with John Clark, and me, on comp, then you have to show a flaw in UDA if you disagree with this. At least Clark tells us where he stops in UDA (step 3, too bad nobody understands his point, which seems an obvious confusion of 1 and 3-views).

I think you did follow the UDA up to step seven. Is it really the step 8 which still makes problem? It is a bit more subtle, some people have some difficulty there. Let us discuss them, or find where we disagree at least.

Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.

What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world'; which is why I suspect people, consciousness, etc. can only exist in a world of matter (note that I'm not saying *primitive* ur-stuff) that can embody the computation. That you use it to conclude that no matter (not even secondary matter) is needed is misleading. But I need to read it again.

Brent

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