On 10/25/2012 8:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Oct 2012, at 22:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/24/2012 11:58 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rusell,
> How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources),
gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.
that愀 the problem that I insist, has a natural solution considering the
computational needs of living beings under natural selection, without
resorting to a everithing-theory of reality based of a UD algorithm,
the Schmidhuber one.
My suspicion is that there does *not* exist a single global
of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that "natural
selection" is a
local computation between each being and its environment. We end up
model where there are many computations occurring concurrently and
no single computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a
picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation
running on a
single computer except for a very trivial case (where the total
in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).
Yes, that'`s also what I think. These computations are material, in the
that they are subject to limitation of resources (nervous signal speeds,
equilibrion, diffusion of hormones etc. So the bias toward a low kolmogorov
complexity of an habitable universe can be naturally deduced from that.
Natural selection is the mechanism for making discoveries, individual life
incorporate these discoveries, called adaptations. A cat that jump to catch
fish has not discovered the laws of newton, Instead, the evolution has
way to modulate the force exerted by the muscles according with how long
must be, and depending on the weight of the cat (that is calibrated by
at the early age).
But this technique depends on the lineality and continuity of the law of
for short distances. If the law of newton were more complicated, that would
be possible. So a low complexity of the macroscopical laws permit a low
complexity and a low use of resources of the living computers that deal with
them, and a faster dsicovery of adaptations by natural selection. But that
complexity has a upper limit; Lineality seems to be a requirement for the
operation of natural selection in the search for adaptations.
I kind of agree with all what you say here, and on the basic philosophy.
think that what you describe admits a more general description, in which
of physics are themselves selected by a process similar but more general
evolution. It makes me think that life (and brains at some different level)
what happen when a universal system mirrors itself. A universal machine is a
dynamical mirror, and life can develop once you put the dynamical mirror in
of itself (again a case of diagonalization). I think I follow your
apply it in arithmetic and/or computer science.
I envision also a kind of selection of the mind over the matter , since the most basic
notion of existence implies and observer, that is,a mind and a mind, in a universe
where history has a meaning (that discard boltzmann brains) , and hold a kind of
intelligence (since intelligence permits to make use of experience) impose very strong
antropic restrictions not only in the nature of the phisical laws, as I said, but in
the matematicity of them. With matematicity i mean a reuse of the same simple
structures at different levels of reality. I mean that the most simple mathematical
structures are more represented in the structure of reality than complicated ones, to
minimize the complexity.
But aren't those all the same conclusions that would arise from assuming that
mathematics and physical laws are our inventions for describing and reasoning about the
world and they are simple because that makes them understandable; they reflect our
limited cognitive ability to think about only a few things at a time. Notice that
physics, as it has become more mathematical and abstract, has left more and more to
contingency and the randomness of QM. So physicists no longer propose to answer, "Why
are there just eight planets?" or "Why is there a Moon?"
Now I am just afraid, to talk frankly, that it looks like you have a
conception of numbers and machines, which does not take into account the
of the universal machine (by the Post-Church-Kleene-Turing thesis) which
miss that your philosophy might be the natural philosophy of all universal
numbers. (I probably exaggerate my point for attempt to be short).
I do not discard your point of view. the difference is that I go the easy path, from
inside to outside, in a cartesian process, may call it, So my interest is centered
not in a simple production principle, and explain the human experience from it, but to
go from consciousness (with some leaps of faith) out to ascertain the nature of what
is known with the aid of some hopefully testable hypotheses. To go in the opposite
direction i need a kind of understanding and inspiration that I don愒 have. I perhaps
need a kind of leap in imagination to see the big picture, but my natural selectionist
bias force me to think that there would be no intellgence without purpose, and no
purpose without environmnetal pressure, that is impossible without an environment, and
a environment impossible without a preexistent matter, with preexistent laws. So a
universal machine seems to me the inmaterial equivalent of a boltzman brain, made
with no purpose, for no purpose and this devoid of meaning, with little to understand
If you're going to explain purpose, meaning, qualia, thoughts,...you need to start from
something simpler that does not assume those things. Bruno proposes to explain matter
as well, so he has to start without matter.
Actually I deduce the absence of matter from comp. If we bet on comp, we have no other
choice than to explain matter from dream coherence notions. We can add matter, but it
would be like invisible horses, and vision is a first person experience and it relies on
the infinities of computation in arithmetic.
If you are with John Clark, and me, on comp, then you have to show a flaw in UDA if you
disagree with this. At least Clark tells us where he stops in UDA (step 3, too bad
nobody understands his point, which seems an obvious confusion of 1 and 3-views).
I think you did follow the UDA up to step seven. Is it really the step 8 which still
makes problem? It is a bit more subtle, some people have some difficulty there. Let us
discuss them, or find where we disagree at least.
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is
your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you
can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make the
argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world'; which is why I suspect
people, consciousness, etc. can only exist in a world of matter (note that I'm not saying
*primitive* ur-stuff) that can embody the computation. That you use it to conclude that
no matter (not even secondary matter) is needed is misleading. But I need to read it again.
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