On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what
is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please
if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make
the argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world';
Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the conuterfactuals does not
require physical activity. In MGA, if you give a role to the conuterfactual, you
violate the 323 principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a particular
computation to object having no physical activity for the actual computation.
But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world.
Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are emulated in the UD, or in
arithmetic. If the 323 principles does not hold for them, it might mean that QM is the
winning computation, but then you have to explain this from arithmetic.
Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain? In that case, my
consciousness would not be invariant when the Q brain is entirely simulated by a
classical machine, and comp is made false.
The latter. But why the restriction to "my consciousness"? Only a small fraction of
thought is conscious.
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