On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > > Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can > be communicated > and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than > qualia.
That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that is typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description of an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will be valid for any body which can navigate public space. > So > extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have > a language for > communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most > people don't speak > differential equations either. But those are all things that can be > shared. The pain of > a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But > there are > experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective > scales of pain. So > I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the > language; I just don't > think color is the best example. > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using the right language. I did a post today on perception which might help http://s33light.org/post/34304933509 In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the more public it is. Simple as that. Craig > > Brent > > On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > I agree. > > > > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It�s > > less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper > > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle > > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they > > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the > > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and > > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more > > basic form of processing and the color processing is more complicated? > > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable > > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary > > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? > > > > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. > > Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question > > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist > > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the > > perception that I have a head with a brain? > > > > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<[email protected] <javascript:>>: > >> Dennett and others on qualia > >> > >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett > >> > >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. > >> > >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the > experience of taking a recreational drug, > >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that > qualia is "an unfamiliar term for > >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways > things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger, > >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The sensation > of colour cannot be accounted for by > >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the > physiologist account for it, if he had fuller > >> knowledge than he has of the processes in > >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical > nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] > >> > >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the > fact that they are seen as posing a > >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body > problem. Much of the debate over their > >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, > >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain > features of qualia. As such, > >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. > >> > >> > >> 2) Dennett on qualia > >> > >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19] > Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to > >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a > practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, > >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of > neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. > >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so > imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the > >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction > of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special > >> properties defined for qualia." > >> > >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says > >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. > >> > >> > >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they are, > but what they do.. > >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, > >> > >> The "What's it like to be?" argument > >> Main article: Subjective character of experience > >> > >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas Nagel's > >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates over > qualia. > >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective > character, a > >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious > mental states if and only i > >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism � something > it is like for the organism." > >> > >> Nagel also suggests that the subjective > >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by the > objective methods of > >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we > acknowledge that a physical theory of mind > >> must account for the subjective character of experience, we must > admit that no presently > >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6] > Furthermore, he states that > >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated > >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective > and objective."[6] > >> > >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) > >> > >> The zombie argument > >> Main article: Philosophical zombie > >> > >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could be > physical duplicates of people, > >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would > demonstrate outward behavior > >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a > subjective phenomenology. > >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility of > philosophical zombies is that > >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give rise > to qualia�the zombie can only > >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the > physical brain." > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Roger Clough, [email protected] <javascript:> > >> 10/25/2012 > >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > >> To post to this group, send email to > >> [email protected]<javascript:>. > > >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] <javascript:>. > >> For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/VoOP8TS2JdoJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
