On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can 
> be communicated 
> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than 
> qualia.  


That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize 
Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that is 
typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description of 
an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will be 
valid for any body which can navigate public space.
 

> So 
> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have 
> a language for 
> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most 
> people don't speak 
> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be 
> shared.  The pain of 
> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people.  But 
> there are 
> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective 
> scales of pain.  So 
> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the 
> language; I just don't 
> think color is the best example. 
>

This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using the 
right language.

I did a post today on perception which might help 
http://s33light.org/post/34304933509

In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The 
more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the more 
public it is. Simple as that.

Craig
 

>
> Brent 
>
> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
> > I agree. 
> > 
> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?  It�s 
> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper 
> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle 
> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they 
> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more complicated? 
> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable 
> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
> > 
> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. 
> > Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question 
> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
> > perception that I have a head with a brain? 
> > 
> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>: 
> >> Dennett and others on qualia 
> >> 
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
> >> 
> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
> >> 
> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the 
> experience of taking a recreational drug, 
> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes that 
> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for 
> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways 
> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger, 
> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The sensation 
> of colour cannot be accounted for by 
> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the 
> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller 
> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in 
> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical 
> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] 
> >> 
> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the 
> fact that they are seen as posing a 
> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body 
> problem. Much of the debate over their 
> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, 
> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain 
> features of qualia. As such, 
> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 2) Dennett on qualia 
> >> 
> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19] 
> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to 
> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a 
> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, 
> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of 
> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. 
> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so 
> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the 
> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction 
> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special 
> >> properties defined for qualia." 
> >> 
> >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says 
> >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they are, 
> but what they do.. 
> >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, 
> >> 
> >> The "What's it like to be?" argument 
> >> Main article: Subjective character of experience 
> >> 
> >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas Nagel's 
> >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates over 
> qualia. 
> >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective 
> character, a 
> >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious 
> mental states if and only i 
> >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism � something 
> it is like for the organism." 
> >> 
> >>   Nagel also suggests that the subjective 
> >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by the 
> objective methods of 
> >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we 
> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind 
> >>   must account for the subjective character of experience, we must 
> admit that no presently 
> >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6] 
> Furthermore, he states that 
> >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated 
> >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective 
> and objective."[6] 
> >> 
> >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) 
> >> 
> >> The zombie argument 
> >> Main article: Philosophical zombie 
> >> 
> >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could be 
> physical duplicates of people, 
> >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would 
> demonstrate outward behavior 
> >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a 
> subjective phenomenology. 
> >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility of 
> philosophical zombies is that 
> >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give rise 
> to qualia�the zombie can only 
> >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the 
> physical brain." 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:> 
> >> 10/25/2012 
> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> >> 
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> > 
>
>

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