> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>> Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color
>> be communicated
>> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta
> That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize
> Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that
> typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description
> an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will
> valid for any body which can navigate public space.
>> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you
>> a language for
>> communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most
>> people don't speak
>> differential equations either. But those are all things that can be
>> shared. The pain of
>> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But
>> there are
>> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective
>> scales of pain. So
>> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the
>> language; I just don't
>> think color is the best example.
> This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using
> right language.
> I did a post today on perception which might help
> In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The
> more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the
> public it is. Simple as that.
>> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>> > I agree.
>> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? Itï¿½s
>> > less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper
>> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle
>> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they
>> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
>> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
>> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
>> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more
>> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable
>> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
>> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
>> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite.
>> > Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the
>> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
>> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
>> > perception that I have a head with a brain?
>> >> Dennett and others on qualia
>> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
>> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine,
>> experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes
>> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
>> things seem to us." Erwin Schrï¿½dinger,
>> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
>> of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
>> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical
>> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." 
>> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from
>> fact that they are seen as posing a
>> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
>> problem. Much of the debate over their
>> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain
>> features of qualia. As such,
>> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>> >> 2) Dennett on qualia
>> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),
>> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to
>> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a
>> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
>> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of
>> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation.
>> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so
>> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the
>> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the
>> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special
>> >> properties defined for qualia."
>> >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says
>> >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them.
>> >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they
>> but what they do..
>> >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above,
>> >> The "What's it like to be?" argument
>> >> Main article: Subjective character of experience
>> >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas
>> >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat? is often cited in debates over
>> >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective
>> character, a
>> >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious
>> mental states if and only i
>> >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism ï¿½
>> it is like for the organism."
>> >> Nagel also suggests that the subjective
>> >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by the
>> objective methods of
>> >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we
>> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind
>> >> must account for the subjective character of experience, we must
>> admit that no presently
>> >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."
>> Furthermore, he states that
>> >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be
>> >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of
>> and objective."
>> >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given)
>> >> The zombie argument
>> >> Main article: Philosophical zombie
>> >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could
>> physical duplicates of people,
>> >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would
>> demonstrate outward behavior
>> >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a
>> subjective phenomenology.
>> >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility of
>> philosophical zombies is that
>> >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give
>> to qualiaï¿½the zombie can only
>> >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the
>> physical brain."
>> >> 10/25/2012
>> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>> >> --
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