On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: > > You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states > of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system > is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is > being executed. >
That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth, activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience. Craig > > Saibal > > > Citeren Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>>: > > > > > > > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: > >> > >> Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color > can > >> be communicated > >> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta > than > >> qualia. > > > > > > That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person visualize > > Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation that > is > > typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a description > of > > an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth will > be > > valid for any body which can navigate public space. > > > > > >> So > >> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you > have > >> a language for > >> communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most > >> people don't speak > >> differential equations either. But those are all things that can be > >> shared. The pain of > >> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But > >> there are > >> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective > >> scales of pain. So > >> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the > >> language; I just don't > >> think color is the best example. > >> > > > > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by using > the > > right language. > > > > I did a post today on perception which might help > > http://s33light.org/post/34304933509 > > > > In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. The > > more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, the > more > > public it is. Simple as that. > > > > Craig > > > > > >> > >> Brent > >> > >> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > >> > I agree. > >> > > >> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It�s > >> > less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper > >> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle > >> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they > >> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the > >> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and > >> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more > >> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more > complicated? > >> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable > >> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary > >> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? > >> > > >> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. > >> > Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the > question > >> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist > >> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the > >> > perception that I have a head with a brain? > >> > > >> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<[email protected] <javascript:>>: > >> >> Dennett and others on qualia > >> >> > >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett > >> >> > >> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. > >> >> > >> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, > the > >> experience of taking a recreational drug, > >> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes > that > >> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for > >> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways > >> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger, > >> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The > sensation > >> of colour cannot be accounted for by > >> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the > >> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller > >> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in > >> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical > >> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] > >> >> > >> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from > the > >> fact that they are seen as posing a > >> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body > >> problem. Much of the debate over their > >> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, > >> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain > >> features of qualia. As such, > >> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> 2) Dennett on qualia > >> >> > >> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19] > >> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to > >> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a > >> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, > >> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of > >> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. > >> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so > >> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the > >> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the > introduction > >> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special > >> >> properties defined for qualia." > >> >> > >> >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says > >> >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they > are, > >> but what they do.. > >> >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, > >> >> > >> >> The "What's it like to be?" argument > >> >> Main article: Subjective character of experience > >> >> > >> >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas > Nagel's > >> >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates over > >> qualia. > >> >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective > >> character, a > >> >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious > >> mental states if and only i > >> >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism � > something > >> it is like for the organism." > >> >> > >> >> Nagel also suggests that the subjective > >> >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by the > >> objective methods of > >> >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we > >> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind > >> >> must account for the subjective character of experience, we must > >> admit that no presently > >> >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6] > >> Furthermore, he states that > >> >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be > contemplated > >> >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of > subjective > >> and objective."[6] > >> >> > >> >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) > >> >> > >> >> The zombie argument > >> >> Main article: Philosophical zombie > >> >> > >> >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could > be > >> physical duplicates of people, > >> >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would > >> demonstrate outward behavior > >> >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a > >> subjective phenomenology. > >> >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility of > >> philosophical zombies is that > >> >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give > rise > >> to qualia�the zombie can only > >> >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the > >> physical brain." > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] <javascript:> > >> >> 10/25/2012 > >> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> Groups "Everything List" group. > >> >> To post to this group, send email to > >> [email protected]<javascript:>. > >> > >> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >> [email protected] <javascript:>. > >> >> For more options, visit this group at > >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/VoOP8TS2JdoJ. > > To post to this group, send email to > > [email protected]<javascript:>. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected] <javascript:>. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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