On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:11, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/27/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 20:30, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Dear Bruno and Alberto,
I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a
"genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw
inertia. It is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that
it belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the
collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or
compression
mechanism.
--
Onward!
Stephen
ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.
Dear Roger,
Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of
each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an
exact isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a
difference between monads or else there is only One.
Right, and in the arithmetical Indra Net, all universal numbers
are different.
And the, by the first person indeterminacy it is like there is a
competition between all of them to bring your most probable next
"instant of life". It looks that, at least on the sharable part,
there are big winners, like this or that quantum hamiltonian. But
we have to explain them through the arithmetical Net structure,
if we want separate properly the quanta from the qualia.
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
A slightly technical question. In the arithmetic IndraNet idea,
what plays the role of the "surface" that is reflective?
reread carefully the UDA. You should understand by yourself that
the "surface" role is played by the first person experience. This
is due to the fact that the experience are UD-delay invariant, and
is a limiting sum on the infinite works of an infinite collection
of universal numbers.
Dear Bruno,
My worry is that you seem to assume the equivalent of an absolute
observer that acts to distinguish the content of the first person
experience (1p) from each other, as simply an inherent difference
between "universal numbers".
Not at all. Where?
On the contrary, it is the difference of the inputs receive by
identical universal numbers which will trigger a branching experience.
It is exactly like the WM scenario, but with the UD protocol (step
seven).
Given that one number can be used to code for other numbers, ala
Godel numbering schemes, how is it that universal numbers can be
said to have any thing unique that would identify them in a non-
trivial way?
?
From the first person perspective no intensional number (the i in
phi_i) can be sure of its relative code, but this is normal in the
comp theory. No machine can know which machine she is, but this does
not prevent them of having experiences, and this with the right measure.
How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other?
This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why
you are using of the word "appear" instead of "are".
"Are"? To who are they different?
To God, if you insist. The difference between 17 and 2 is 15,
independently of any observer or universe.
Your idea here seems to depend on a pre-established harmony like
situation.
No, it depends on elementary arithmetic, like all theories which use
the number.
If you believe that "17 -2 = 15" is a function of observer, I will ask
you "in which theory (of number and observer"?". I will ask you for
describing the functional dependence.
You answer will make sense only in a theory which do no more depend on
the observer.
If you doubt that 17-2=15" is absolute, I am not sure any theory you
can give to me will make sense.
I'm afraid your remark might validly demolish the whole of the science
enterprise.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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