On 10/29/2012 11:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 29.10.2012 19:21 meekerdb said the following:
On 10/29/2012 10:21 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Some more quotes from From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
 Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen.

p. 45 "Agreed, we cannot demonstrate that in principle, as a matter
of logic, mathematical modeling must inevitably be a distortion of
what is modeled, although models actually constructed cannot have
perfection reachable in principle. But on the other hand, the
conviction that perfect modeling is possible in principle - what
Paul Teller calls the "perfect model model" - does not have an a
priori justification either!"

p. 83 "Suppose now that science gives us a model which putatively
represents the world in full detail. Suppose even we believe that
this is so. Suppose we regard ourselves as knowing that it is so.
Then still, before we can go on to use that model, to make
predictions and build bridges, we must locate ourselves with
respect to that model.

If the model is complete it must already include us - as well as what
we will think about it and do with it.  But then this will run into
Godelian incompleteness.  If it is true it will be unprovable within
the model.

The question would be how it should be done practically. Say let us imagine that such a model is the M-theory (I am still impressed by Grand Design by Hawking). How do I find myself in the M-theory?

In practice, which I'm sure you're familiar with, we don't 'locate ourselves in the model'. The model is in the objective world that we share with others who are also not in the model. An engineer designing an airliner considers the airliner carrying other people, but he doesn't model them completely - only their weight, size, use of the restrooms, entertainment, etc. He doesn't try to model their inner thoughts unrelated to the airliner. So a model, to be useful, cannot be complete because part of its usefulness is that it can be communicated and must be 3p, as Bruno would say. That's not to say that someone's inner thoughts cannot be in some model (the often are in novels), but only that they can't be in that same person's model; just like a Godel sentence unprovable in one system can be provable in some other axiom system.


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