On 01.11.2012 18:00 meekerdb said the following:
On 11/1/2012 5:03 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 30.10.2012 17:08 meekerdb said the following:
On 10/30/2012 4:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model
for a typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well
as a scientific model, but to use the map one has to find out
where on the map he/she is located. I hope that you agree with
I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked
a map to see how close Sandy came to my brother's home in
Virginia. I didn't need to locate myself on that map.
In this case you need to locate your brother's home on that map. I
do not see too much difference.
I would agree with you that my statement does not cover all
possible cases that one could imagine to employ a map, but the act
of location should be there anyway. There is a correspondence
between a real world and a map but the map by itself does not
coordinate the reality to itself. This is done by a human being.
Let me recall Van Fraassen's definition of a representation
p. 21 “Z uses X to depict Y as F”
The map seems to fit this pattern pretty well.
Could you imagine some case, when you use a map as a map and you do
not need the act of location?
Of course not. But in many cases I do not need to locate myself,
which was crucial to van Frassen's point about self reference.
It was just a special case. It was my fault that I have not described it
better. In the general case this is The Problem of Coordination (chapter
5 in the book).
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