Hi Evgenii Rudnyi  

Weyl makes complicated what is ultimately simple--
reality, which is subjective, which is experiencing,
which is now. Which is focussing your attention
on your breath going out and coming in. This is what
yoga teaches. Weyl does best we he touches on color.

Reality is knowledge by acquaintance. The best that science
can give us is knowledge by description. But that is
just words, code, and words are not reality. The
only reality is in experiencing, such as experiencing
your breathing.

Kierkegard said it much better than Weyl, when he
stated that truth is subjective.
 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/4/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Evgenii Rudnyi  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 14:01:41 
Subject: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality 


Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation:  
Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism  
between mathematics and reality. 

p. 208 "Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934: 

'A science can never determine its subject-matter expect up to  
isomorphic representation. The idea of isomorphism indicates the  
self-understood, insurmountable barrier of knowledge. [...T]oward the  
"nature" of its objects science maintains complete indifference.' (Weyl  
1934:19) 

The initial assertion is clearly based on two basic convictions: 

o that scientific representation is mathematical, and 
o that in mathematics no distinction cuts across structural sameness." 

p. 209 "Weyl illustrates this with the example of a color space and an  
isomorphic geometric object. ... The color space is a region on the  
projective plane. If we can nevertheless distinguish the one from the  
other, or from other attribute spaces with that structure, doesn't that  
mean that we can know more that what science, so conceived, can deliver?  
Weyl accompanies his point about this limitation with an immediate  
characterization of the 'something else' which is then left un-represented. 

'This - for example what distinguish the colors from the point of the  
projective plane - one can only know in immediate alive intuition.' (Ibid.)" 

p. 210 "We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: 

o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or 

o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical  
representation alone, or 

o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be  
incomplete, or 

o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism,  
are illusory. 

In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for  
the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of  
this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something  
that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a  
proposition that could be part of some scientific theory?" 

Evgenii 
--  
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen 

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