On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following:
On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
p. 210 "We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable
o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is
o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical
representation alone, or
o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it
to be incomplete, or
o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across
isomorphism, are illusory.
In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt
for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the
either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is
there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not
expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific
It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is
incomplete in a way we know.
Could you please express this knowledge explicitly?
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