On 03 Nov 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/3/2012 8:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can beconsidered as the (only) object. truth concerns only thepropositions about those objects and the derivative notions.OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth isindependent of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal toexperience?Explain me why how you think that the content of the primeness of43 depends on experience, and of whom.Dear Bruno,The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it canbe apprehended, at least in principle, by at least one entity(please note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies thatin the absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least oneentity) that there is no such thing as primeness.

`This is totally ridiculous, Stephen. With comp, it is obvious that the`

`primacy of 43 is conceptually far simpler than the (true) fact that`

`the primacy of 43 can be apprehended by a type of machine/numbers.`

`You are like a biologist telling Morgan that it is stupid to hope to`

`understand the genetic of the fly before understanding the genetic of`

`the zoologist.`

Bruno

The "dependency" that I am claiming for the properties of numbers isno different from the dependency of properties (in the sense ofbeing definite) for physical objects; there must exist some means todetermine or otherwise measure or prove what those particularproperties might be.Finitists fail because they assume that only a finite number ofentities can in principle exist that can determine the properties ofsome arbitrary number. (See Normal J. Wildberger's ideas for anexample of finitism in mathematics) I propose that there are aninfinity of possible worlds, each with a potential infinity ofentities that can, at least in principle, determine the propertiesof any arbitrary number. This is the same idea, I think, as Godel'sinfinite tower of theories, each of which can determine the truthvalue for any theory which is a subset of it or implied to existby it.I am just inverting the idea of the Forcing axiom of Cohen. Istart with an ambiguous notion of the One and reduce it down towhere it is a fragment, a monad, a subset of the totality of allpossible, and yet it reflects all of its ancestors as it isnever not a proper part of the One. This is just an elaboration ofLeibniz' idea of monads...The idea that a property has content is nonsensical, IMHO.Primeness (of numbers) is a property of numbers, and like any otherobject, they are nothing more than bounded bundles (clopen sets?) ofproperties defined in relation to other bounded bundles ofproperties. Only the One is isolated and independent of all things,as it *is* all things! It cannot be "aware" of anything other thanitself, by definition.-- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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