On 27 Nov 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The you are all the guy who feel to be you, all the time.

So you is you. Thanks for clearing that up.


> You are using the pronouns in the confusing way, as you use "you", when I use always 1-you, and 3-you. In the mulitiplication, the 3- yous multiplies, and the 1-you mutliply too, in the 3-views, but not from any of each possible 1-views. So from the 1-views, it is like a sequence of random event,

Bruno Marchal says John Clark is confusing in the use of the pronoun "you" and then give us the above incredible stew of mashed yous.

I said that in the experience, "you" can be applied to all the H-man, the original in Helsinki, and the copies in W and M. And you agree on that, like you agreed that the W and M experience are exclusive, making the 1-view unique from the 1-view point.

>> But it's not just "you", Bruno Marchal is also inconsistent on who the Helsinki guy is, sometimes he's the guy experiencing Helsinki and then the Helsinki guy will see no city at all when he pushes that button, not even Helsinki;

>This contradicts comp.
If you say so. This confirms that I know almost nothing about "comp", and have little desire to know more.

OK, so you say "no" to the doctor, now. This makes my point, as if you don't believe in the consequence of comp, like the fact that you can survive a teleportation (here), then indeed you have to disbelieve comp. That's the point.

> It would mean he did not survive classical teleportation

No it does not,

Ah! you still believe in comp.

it just means that if you define "the Helsinki Man" as the man who's experiencing Helsinki and after the button is pressed nobody is experiencing Helsinki anymore then there is no Helsinki man anymore; but of course that's no problem to the former Helsinki man, he's doing fine in Washington AND Moscow.

This contradicts what you say above. We have agree that the Helsinky man survive in both M and W in the 3view, and in W or M in the 1-view (as it is exclusive).

And this illustrates why precision of language is so important in a world with duplicating chambers.

> Just look at the context, and chose the meaning which makes the point consistent. It seems obvious for most.

As a mathematician you must know that it is the step that is so "obviously" true that you don't even bother to mention it that has brought many a proof to grief.

No I proved it, but you refute it systematically by confusing the 3- view on the 1-views and the 1-views on the 1view, as asked in the protocol.

>> It might be helpful if Bruno Marchal could explain, without using pronouns but by giving the subject a actual name, how "the 3p view on the 1p views" (whatever that is) differs from some other view.

>After the duplication:

There is one relevant 3p view, and it is:
"John-Clark-M enjoys Russian coffee and John-Clark-W enjoys American coffee".

There are two relevant 1-p views, which are
"I enjoy a russian coffee". And,
"I enjoy American coffee".

And I am John Clark the Helsinki guy and after the button is pushed I John Clark the former Helsinki guy will enjoy a russian coffee and I John Clark the former Helsinki guy will enjoy a American coffee.

Which makes it obvioulsy a 3-view on the 1-view. But as you agree those 1-view are exclusive, it entails there were no predictable with certainty.

>> obviously there is no unique future 1 view for the Helsinki man,

> Why?
Even in the 3p views, they are two unique (subjectively unique) futures.

That is a blatant contradiction, if there are 2 of something then it's not unique.

Then the two people should feel the two experience simulatneously, and wrote "I feel to be in M and I feel to be in W", with the same referent for "I". You get Chalmers idea that copies of human acquires telepathic means.

However even with duplicating chambers the past first person view remains unique, the Washington man was the Helsinki man and only the Helsinki man and the Moscow man was the Helsinki man and only the Helsinki man

Very good!

Thank you, but it doesn't work the other way because time has a direction, entropy increases the the present to the future.

>> So the pronoun "you" doesn't refer to anything

>Why? It refers clearly to two persons,

One pronoun is used to refer to two entirely different people in complex thought experiment involving personal identity and Bruno Marchal wonders why such a "clear" pronoun could possibly cause confusion. But then again, for advocates of bad ideas confusion is a good thing.

You add the confusion by failing to distinguih, at one place, (nor everywhere) the 1 and 3 views.

>>> The prediction W is wrong

>> But I find Bruno Marchal in Washington and Bruno Marchal informs me that the prediction was correct.

> You have to listen to Bruno Marchal in Moscow too.

Why? Will Bruno Marchal in Moscow somehow convince me that Bruno Marchal in Washington was incorrect about Bruno Marchal being in Washington?

No, but about having been sure, in Helsinki, that he would be the one in Washington. The feeling of the M-man directly refute that certainty.

I don't think so because there is nothing wrong about 2 things being at 2 places at the same time and there are two of you because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

Yes, but from the 1-view, it is not like a duplication, it is like being one and entire in one place, and getting a doppelganger in the other place.

>> OK Bruno, the experiment is long over and now that you have all the information you will ever have on the matter what would have been the correct prediction back in Helsinki, W or M? I'm not asking for a prediction, the experiment is now in the past so interview anybody and everybody and tell me did "you" see W or M? Bruno Marchal insists there is one unique answer so let's hear it!

> ?


> On the contrary they all agree with "W or M", ad they all live W, or M.

Well which is it?

One of them.

The experiment is over and it's time to find out, did it turn out to be W or M? It's silly to assign a 50-50 probability, or any other probability (except 100% or 0%) AFTER something has happened.

This is done before. But we can confirm or refute it after. Like we can derive experimental probabilities from frequencies of events.

If you send a photon toward 2 slits quantum mechanics can give you probabilities about where the photon will hit a photographic plate, but that's all. it can't give you certainty. However once the experiment is over you can tell where it hit the plate with no doubt whatsoever

Suppose that you and me enter the same duplication box simultaneously. I can also describe the probability on which city we will both see, like with P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, and after the duplication, we open the door and we both can agree if we see W, or if we see M.
It is the same with the quantum was without collapse.

and you don't need abstruse philosophy or advanced equations to do it, you just develop the photographic plate. This experiment is over too and Bruno Marchal predicted there would be one and only one answer, either W or M.

Like the photon will hit the screen here or there, despite the wave does not. Even after the measurement is done, in the QM without collapse. I don't see the difference.

so now that its over I want to know the results, was it Washington or was it Moscow?

See just above.

Enough philosophizing, it's time to develop the photographic plate so to speak and find out what city beat out the other city.

When we open the door of the reconstitution box, the measurement gives unambiguously a definite outcome.

> You keep confusing the 3-views on the 1-views and the 1-views about themselves,

You should get a rubber stamp of that phrase made, it's your standard reply to all criticisms, and as I've said before if something is identical from the 3-view it is certainly identical from the 1-view (although the reverse is not always true); it you don't understand this point it is you that is confused, very confused indeed.

I repeat it because you repeat since some time that confusion. You confuse the result of the measurement (which can only be W or only M, as comp prevents to feel in both place at once) with the 3p description where you can see from outside the two measurement done simultaneously, but not lived as such by anyone. Same with the two slits: QM describes the two different outcomes of the measurement, but we keep a notion of probability, because, in Everett, the two (observer + observed) inherit the superposition of the state of the particle.

If you can avoid the confusion in Everett QM, it is weird that you persist doing it in comp.



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