On 25 Nov 2012, at 22:00, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Nov 25, 2012 at 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> Amnesic can survive.
That's what most people would say. But I explicitly NOT use amnesia in
the UDA, because it is more difficult to handle, and touch the
difficult notion of personal identity, which is not needed to
understand the consequence of comp about the relation between physics
and machine's psychology.
If I erased all of your memories and replaced them with new and
different ones then saying Bruno Marchal still survives would be
like saying a dead Bruno Marchal still survives because his twin
brother, who was separated at birth and never met, still survives.
> but your question is irrelevant as we both have already agree that
the H-man survives in bit W and M. They have both the right to say
they are the H-man.
But the H-man doesn't have the right to call himself the W or M man
because they don't exist yet and the future is always uncertain.
Well, not always, but certainly in this case. This betrays that you
get the point. The H-man cannot say it will be the M-man, or the W-
man, and of course he knows that he will not be both, and he knows,
given the protocol and comp, that he will fell like one of them, so he
can only say that he will be the W-man or the M-man, from his future
first person pov, which exists and is unique by comp.
>>I repeat my challenge, please give an example of 2 brains that are
identical in form and operation from the third party point of view
but different from the first party point of view, from anybody or
anything's first, second or N'th party point of view.
> You asked me this 10 times already, and I have always answer the
same thing: two identical brain leads to the same first person
> but the same first person experience can be brought by different
Which makes it one first person experience not two.
>I think we agree.
So stop telling me I'm confused and that something is true from the
third person but not the first person.
From the third person, after the duplication and box opening, you are
in both city (3p), but you feel to be in one city (1p). This does not
contradict (brain A = brain B) ==> one 1p, as the brain differentiate
quickly and the question is about which differentiation you will live.
> You just forget that the prediction is asked on the first person
Which we've just agree is the same as a third person feeling if that
third person had a identical brain.
Frankly it really looks like you play stupid. The prediction is on
which different brain (the one in W after the box is open, versus the
one in M) you will feel to own.
>> When "you" open the box one of "you" will see Washington and
turn into the Washington man and one of "you" will see Moscow and
turn into the Moscow man.
>> And both will be the Helsinki man
>> and both will retain a equal right to use the title "you" yet
neither will be each other because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
> Exactly, and that is why the Helsinki guy cannot be sure if he
will experience seeing W or M.
WHO THE HELL IS "HE"???
Some guy who will have an experience. He is notably, the Helsinki guy.
It is before the duplication, and he knows with certainty that
whatever happen he will feel to be in once city. But he cannot know
which feeling he will live with certainty. Still, he know that he will
feel to be either the W-man or the M-man, and never both at once, so
he is indterminate about his future feeling.
Bruno Marchal just agreed that the Helsinki guy will turn into the
Washington guy and see Washington AND Bruno Marchal just agreed that
the Helsinki guy will turn into the Moscow guy and see Moscow
In the 3p view on the 1p views. But the guy in Helsinki knows that he
will with certainty feel to be in one city, and obviously he cannot
predict which one. he cannot predict his future 1view, as seen by its
future 1-view, with certainty. He knows for sure (given the protocol)
only that it will be W or M.
so obviously the Helsinki guy will see Moscow AND the Helsinki guy
will see Washington.
That's correct, but does not address the question which is about the
unique future 1view that he will live with certainty.
As for what this mysterious amorphous ambiguous entity named "he"
will see who the hell knows, or cares.
It is capital, and used implicitly to recover the Born rule in QM
(successfully or not, that is another topic).
The importance of this will become clearer in step seven.
Here you persist in avoiding the question about the future unique
first person view, which you accept to exist by comp.
> You just explain the indeterminacy, which is not paradoxical
because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED INDEED.
Yes YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, so when Bruno Marchal asks the
question "what city will "you" see?" who is supposed to be doing the
The point is that with comp, we cannot tell. But we can tell that from
the 3p it is both, and from the 1p its one of them; but we cannot
predict which one in advance. this is even clearer in the iterated
duplication. After ten iteration, you should see clearly the
difference as all copies write very different histories in their
diaries. the guy who get
Will have no clue if he will feel, at the next iteration, to be
And that is what he is asked to predict.
And given that both the duplication and the seeing happens in the
future who is Bruno Marchal asking the question of?
Nobody needs to know that. By definition the guy to which we asked the
question is the (still unique) H-guy, and when duplicated, he is the H-
guy in M, and he is the H-guy in W. And so we ask the confirmation of
the prediction to both. Given that "W" (resp M) represent the 1p-
feeling of being in W (resp M) we have obviously that:
The prediction W is wrong
The prediction M is wrong
The prediction W and M is wrong
The prediction W or M is correct
> You just agreed above (and before) that the W-man and the W-man
have the right to say he is the H-man.
Yes but the H-man doesn't have the right to call himself the W-man
or the M-man because while the H-man exists they do not, not yet,
and nobody identifies with their future self but with their past
self; that's why we see the past differently than the future.
Suppose the H-guy is addicted to coffee, and accept to do the
experience only if we promise to him that after the duplication he
will get a cup of coffee. It will work if we decide to give coffee
after the reconstitution, both in M and W. In that case he can be sure
he will have a cup of coffee (as he needs), but he cannot be sure if
he will feel to drink it in W or in M.
We do identify ourselves with our future self, even in case we don't
know the future. A soldier can hope to survive on a battle field.
You continue to deny the obvious, which is that in the duplication
experience it is certain that you will feel to stay unique, but you
cannot be certain if that feeling will be lived in M or in M. It is
obvious once you distinguish the 1-views and the 3-views, and listen
to what the copies are saying. You have to put yourself in the place
of all copies, one by one, to see the point.
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