On 11/26/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But the H-man doesn't have the right to call himself the W or M man because they don't exist yet and the future is always uncertain.Well, not always, but certainly in this case. This betrays that you get the point. The H-man cannot say it will be the M-man, or the W-man, and of course he knows that he will not be both, and he knows, given the protocol and comp, that he will fell like one of them,

Isn't it more accurately "that both of them will feel like him."? To say "he will feel like one of them." requires that you solve the problem of personal identity in some way that there is a unique "he".

    > You just forget that the prediction is asked on the first person feeling

Which we've just agree is the same as a third person feeling if that third person had a identical brain. Frankly it really looks like you play stupid. The prediction is on which different brain (the one in W after the box is open, versus the one in M) you will feel to own.

But again that assumes that "you" is something unique, yet the hypothesis of duplication is contrary to this. The lesson I take from this is that comp implies there is no unique "you"; which is also what Everett's MWI implies.


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