On 26 Nov 2012, at 19:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/26/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But the H-man doesn't have the right to call himself the W or M man because they don't exist yet and the future is always uncertain.Well, not always, but certainly in this case. This betrays that you get the point. The H-man cannot say it will be the M-man, or the W-man, and of course he knows that he will not be both, and he knows, given the protocol and comp, that he will fell like one of them,

Isn't it more accurately "that both of them will feel like him."?

The question ias aked to the H-man, when he is still in Helsinki, before the duplication. So "both of them will feel" is correct but it is a 3-view on the 1-views. But the guy believes in comp, ans so believes that he will feel one and entire in one city. He can't be sure of which one a priori, unless, like Bohm, it adds special particles following only one branch and that the other guy is a zombie, but again that would contradict comp.

To say "he will feel like one of them." requires that you solve the problem of personal identity in some way that there is a unique "he".

That is the most easy part of the "consciousness problem" in comp. Your memory diary remains unique from your local computation points of view". All you need to accept about identity is that your survive a teleportation, qua computation, but then you survive a duplication too, and can only be indeterminate on what it will look like: W or M, for both copies, which are both you, in the 3-sense, and each gives a unique you, in the 1-sense. This makes the outcome indeterminate, but that's the point.

> You just forget that the prediction is asked on the first person feeling

Which we've just agree is the same as a third person feeling if that third person had a identical brain. Frankly it really looks like you play stupid. The prediction is on which different brain (the one in W after the box is open, versus the one in M) you will feel to own.

But again that assumes that "you" is something unique, yet the hypothesis of duplication is contrary to this.

With comp the 1-you is determined by your program and its current unique input. So it is clear who you are after the duplication. For us you are in both places, and from each 1-you, you are in a unique place, with your usual unique you (just one bit more informed, pun included).

The lesson I take from this is that comp implies there is no unique "you"; which is also what Everett's MWI implies.

Yes. There are many "yous" indeed, and we might already be the same person, as memory differences are quite relative. But each of us, by comp, can access only its local memory, determinated by the possible computations going through their state, and they all feel unique, from their normal 1-view point of views.



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