Hi Bruno,

Another quote I can't find is one to the effect that

"For every complex problem one can usually find simple
solutions that are almost always wrong."

This is the case with modern cognitive science:

1)  It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
both substances as material. Hence we have a number
of of mind/brain theories that dance aournd accept these
two subjstances as being the same. Descartes, oddly enough, seems to 
have ignored this problem. Leibniz treated both mind and brain as mind
(Idealism), which correctly allowed unity of mind and brain, but
he has been ignored.

2) Modern cognitive science does not allow introspection, because
it isn't rational. Kant does give a rational interpretation of
synthesis, which requires  introspection, through adopting an
alternate (nonintrospective) path, a rational prodecure which is very 
complicated and hard to understand, if it indeed works at all. 
A semiotic approach would seem to be- at least  in principle -
much better, because it includes 1p, (in the form of relations) 
although I have not seen how this works yet. Leibniz 
in his monads attempts to deal with this problem through
a third party  (the Supreme Monad), but the details are
unspecified.



[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Roger Clough 
Receiver: Roger Clough 
Time: 2012-12-05, 07:47:47
Subject: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive science


Hi Bruno, 

I found the quote I had been searching for: 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/

"Kant thought that transcendental arguments were a priori or 
yielded the a priori in all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of 
this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection 
[the empirical, not logical method of synthesis]
fell out of favour about 100 years ago, the alternative approach 
[Kant's method of synthesis] adopted was exactly this approach. 

Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major method 
used by experimental cognitive scientists. 

Other things equally central to Kant's approach to the mind have not been taken 
up by cognitive science, as we will see near the end, a key part of his 
doctrine of synthesis and most of what he had to say about consciousness 
of self in particular. Far from his model having been superseded 
by cognitive science, some important things have not even been 
assimilated by it. "


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Roger Clough  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-05, 05:05:38 
Subject: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind 


Hi Bruno Marchal  

Indeed, we can not code for [1p].  But we need not abandon 
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive 
theory has done.   We can replace [1p] by its actions -  
those of perception,  in which terms are relational (subject: object).  
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. 

That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or 
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. 
Your responses seem to leave out such relations.  I cannot find  
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument  
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive 
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize  
cognition.  While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work 
when living breathing humans are concerned. 

IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent 
computer calculations from emulating the mind. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth 




On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: 


On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:  
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines 
knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from 
outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable.  The 1p 
truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not 
necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). 


Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.  
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.  
Many things true about us is not codable either. 

Let me see if I understand that.  I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p" 
describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine.  


No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2. 










That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in 
its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the 
state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."  


Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing 
universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.  


But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new 
'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical 
proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is 


Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2. 


We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like 
Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in 
arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a soprt 
of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained). 










One could include such second-level states (which one might want to communicate 
to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another first-level state. 
Right? 



Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the "I 
believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I will be 
the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the truth. It is 
easy to do for the sound correct machine.  


Bruno 









Brent 



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