Hi Stephen,
> This is the case with modern cognitive science: >> >> 1) It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) >> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating >> both substances as material. >> > > A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is > outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism > of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, > thus negating dualism. > > > Dear Telmo, > > There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of > each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, > here<http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf>. > Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the > wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with > each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations > that bodies can have of themselves. > Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. > > > > I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely > weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I > don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. > Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical > laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. > > > Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person > sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for > it. > I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
