On 05 Dec 2012, at 22:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 3:51 PM, Telmo Menezes
<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Roger,
This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1) It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor of treating
both substances as material.
A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If
mind is
outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any
mechanism of
interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical
world, thus
negating dualism.
I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something
extremely weird
about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
don't
buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
Yet, any
explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
laws (or
vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
Telmo, String theory monads, the particles of compactified extra
string dimensions, 6 dimensions each, called Calabi-Yau compact
manifolds, are uniformly distributed in space in a rather crystalline
structure, yet are effectively outside spacetime because each monad
maps the universe instantly to its interior; and if that were not
enough, the monads being space precipitating from space in the big
bang, they are motionless and therefore form a Bose-Einstein
Condensate BEC in which light can propagate at any speed including
infinite speed. Those monads also contain the laws and constants of
physics and they regulate physical particle interactions.
Bet on string theory and you get everything in one package.
BTW the instantaneous monad perception is my hypothesis.
A 3-D solution is not available yet.
But the other properties of CY compact manifolds are well known in
string theory.
Richard
Even if string theory is correct, it is better to extract it from comp.
If not you miss the genuine (with respect to comp) qualia, and keep
consciousness under the rug.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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