On 28 Nov 2012, at 23:05, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> you agreed that the W and M experience are exclusive, making the 1-
view unique from the 1-view point.
Everybody has a unique viewpoint looking back into the past, nobody
has a unique viewpoint looking to the future.
> you have to disbelieve comp.
OK, you know more about your homemade word that I do so I defer to
your greater expertise, I don't believe in this thing called "comp".
From your reply to Craig, I think that you do. Unless you have change
your mind. You abandon step 1? is the doppelganger a zombie, or not
functionning, or someone else (and you die)?
>> it just means that if you define "the Helsinki Man" as the man
who's experiencing Helsinki and after the button is pressed nobody
is experiencing Helsinki anymore then there is no Helsinki man
anymore; but of course that's no problem to the former Helsinki man,
he's doing fine in Washington AND Moscow.
> This contradicts what you say above. We have agree that the
Helsinky man survive in both M and W
John Clark can't agree with anything about "the Helsinki man" until
John Clark knows what "the Helsinki man" means. If "the Helsinki
man" is defined as "the man that is currently experiencing Helsinki"
then nobody fits that description after the button is pushed. If
"the Helsinki man" is "anyone who remembers being in Helsinki before
the button is pushed" then 2 people fit that description.
We agreed on this.
This shows that Bruno Marchal is being incredibly sloppy not just
with pronouns but with noun phrases too, John Clark doesn't
understand how Bruno Marchal expects to construct a precise
mathematical proof with that sort of ambiguity.
Not at all. We have agreed on what you say above more than once. I
don't see what you bring that back. What you say does not change the
fact that with comp I survive in the first person view as one and
unique, and so I am sure I will fee to be one and unique, in both
place, from which it is not hard to get, that I will feel like getting
one bit of information in the process, W or M, and I can't be sure of
which one, before pushing on the button.
>>>> OK Bruno, the experiment is long over and now that you have all
the information you will ever have on the matter what would have
been the correct prediction back in Helsinki, W or M? I'm not asking
for a prediction, the experiment is now in the past so interview
anybody and everybody and tell me did "you" see W or M? Bruno
Marchal insists there is one unique answer so let's hear it!
>>> they all agree with "W or M", ad they all live W, or M.
>> Well which is it?
> One of them.
Well which is it?
W-for he W-man, and M for the M-man. Both will agree that they could
not have predicted.
Like the guy who get the story, in the iterated version,
00000000000010 could not have expected that particular story with
certainty.
>> The experiment is over and it's time to find out, did it turn out
to be W or M? It's silly to assign a 50-50 probability, or any other
probability (except 100% or 0%) AFTER something has happened.
> This is done before. But we can confirm or refute it after.
OK, you predicted it would turn out to be W or M but not both, so to
confirm your prediction and claim victory all you have to do is tell
me how the experiment turned out, was it W or M?
OK. My prediction is "W or M but not both". In that case both confirms.
When ask how the experience turn out to the W-copy, he answered "It
was W, and not M, so "W or M" was correct, and "not both was correct".
But with comp, I have to ask the M-copy, and he answered "It was M,
and not W, so again both prediction "W or M" and "not both" are
verified.
"W and M" is never lived by the copies, and so is never verified.
>> If you send a photon toward 2 slits quantum mechanics can give
you probabilities about where the photon will hit a photographic
plate, but that's all. it can't give you certainty. However once the
experiment is over you can tell where it hit the plate with no doubt
whatsoever
> Suppose that you and me enter the same duplication box
simultaneously. I can also describe the probability on which city we
will both see, like with P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, and after the
duplication, we open the door and we both can agree if we see W, or
if we see M.
So which was it W or M?
W for the W-couples, and M for the M couples. The one betting on "W
and M" lost.
> It is the same with the quantum was without collapse.
It's not the same at all! If I send a bunch of photons at 2 slits I
can use quantum mechanics to predict that 90% of them will hit in
that area of the photographic plate and 10% in that other area, and
after the experiment is over we can see if my prediction was correct
by developing the plate and counting the photons. But I can also
send one and only one photon toward the slits and I can still have a
pretty good idea about what area it will probably hit, if you bet me
it would hit in the 10% area I'd take that bet because there is a
90% probability I'll double my money and only a 10% chance I'll
loose it. However I'd take no bets with you on your thought
experiment because you've made it clear you'd renege on the bet,
even though you predicted it would be W or M but not both and even
though AFTER the experiment you still could not say which one you'd
still refuse to pay up.
Not when you duplicate the population and the bank. The Dutch book
definition of probability works well.
>>and you don't need abstruse philosophy or advanced equations to do
it, you just develop the photographic plate. This experiment is over
too and Bruno Marchal predicted there would be one and only one
answer, either W or M.
> Like the photon will hit the screen here or there, despite the
wave does not. Even after the measurement is done, in the QM without
collapse.
Before QM says the photon will hit here or there but AFTER the
experiment you know with 100% certainty that the photon hit the
photographic plate here and not there,
before, in Helsinki you have probability, but after pushing on the
button, then, in all circumstances you see a definite result (whoever
you become, as both copies confirms this).
So I don't see the difference.
and so we can test theories. In your thought experiment you used
your theory and said it would be W or M but not both, AFTER the
experiment you claim that all you can still say is W or M,
In your imagination only. All the copies can say where they are after
the experience. You attribute me statements that I have never said.
so you really haven't made a prediction at all, thus we can conclude
that it's a bad theory or a bad thought experiment or both.
No after the experience, both copies see a definite result, and that
is why you can be sure that after pushing on the buttion you will
either see W, or M, and not both, but you can predict which one. You
can test the probability, by iterating the experience, and the math
show this give white noise for the vast majority of the 2^x copies.
> When we open the door of the reconstitution box, the measurement
gives unambiguously a definite outcome.
Then I ask yet again, was the unambiguous definite outcome W or M?
The point is that it can only be one of them, for both subject. So it
was W for one of them, and M for the other. The question bears on the
first person experience, and none lives a first person experience of
being in W and M.
> You confuse the result of the measurement (which can only be W or
only M
So which one was it W or M?
W for one half of the copies, and W for the other halves. The first
indeterminacy comes from that. by definition of first person, you must
look at the predictions and confirmations related in the diaries.
> Same with the two slits: QM describes the two different outcomes
of the measurement
Yes QM predicts the photon will hit here or there with a certain
probability, but afterward the measurement produces only one
outcome, as can be seen when we develop the photographic plate
There is no reduction. In Everett QM, there are many photographic
plates, containing respectively different John Clark looking at them.
We can share the proba because we share the histories by contagion of
superposition, leading to a comp first person plural sharable
indeterminacy.
and see only one point not two, its a point right there plain as day
with no doubt whatsoever. Your theory predicts "or", it says there
will be one and only one result so all I want to know is what that
result is, was the outcome of the measurement, W or M?
Come on. It is very simple that you have to ask that question to all
copies, and that you will have all value. the same happens if you
could interview all the John Clark bifurcating on an iterated
Schroedingers cat type of measurement.
> we can derive experimental probabilities from frequencies of events.
OK, then tell me how you score this thing, how do you do the
counting? After just one event I would put check marks next to both
W AND M, but you disagree and say it's W OR M, so I ask again, after
one event do you put check marks next to W or M?
To W, for the experience of seeing W. And M for the experience of
seeing M.
You will never check "W and M" as this first person experience never
happens, with the meaning I made precise on W (= I feel to be in W
right now) and M (idem respectively).
> so now that its over I want to know the results, was it Washington
or was it Moscow?
> See just above.
I don't want to see above and I don't want more philosophy I just
want to know the results of a experiment, you said it would be W or
M so I want to know which one it turned out to be.
W for the W-man. M for the M-man. The point is that none were able to
predict that outcome.
Bruno
John K Clark
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