2012/12/15 John Clark <[email protected]> > On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of >>> it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all >>> probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and >>> just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I >>> would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in >>> Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world >>> you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason >>> existed. >>> >> >> >Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a >> 50% chance it would transport you. >> > > So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would > simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would > remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin > was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch > would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew > all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance > that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will > remain in Helsinki. > >> >>> >>> as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your >>>> comfort. >>>> >>> >>> >> Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most >>> people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all >>> "first person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying "I dunno". >>> >> >> >It's more than simple ignorance though. Even with perfect knowledge you >> cannot know. >> > > John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington) > causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see > Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn > into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep > but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental > causes, and "first person indeterminacy" is just a pompous way of saying "I > dunno" about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark. > > >> > Even if you are God you cannot know. >> > > Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense. > > >> > Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why: >> You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the >> skyline and find it includes the Kremlin. The experimental setup says your >> duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington >> monument. One of you saw the Kremlin and became the "saw the Kremlin man" >> and the other saw the Washington monument and became the "saw the >> Washington monument man". Through the duplication and observance of >> something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of >> observing a random unpredictable event. >> > > The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual > involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw > the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he > saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then > he's be the Washington man. And he's not. > > John K Clark >
So in your world, it is impossible to assign probabilities for subjective feeling in a duplication experiment, yet still in your vision, you can in a MWI context and you see absolutely no contradiction with that, agreed ? If you agree, then I think we can spare electrons from now on. Quentin > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
