John,
On 24 Dec 2012, at 21:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno and Brent:
we T H I N K we have an idea what 'qualia' may be and ACCEPT our
figment on 'quanta' (i.e numbered 'objects' - figments as well).
None of the two(?) are closer to the essence (read: 'truth') we just
got better used (evolved?) to quantitative thinking and language
concerning such because it seemed simpler to follow in primitive life.
But there are tools in math to handle qualities too, like modal logic.
Such tools cannot create qualia, nor perhaps explain them completely,
but Earth Geography cannot create Earth, nor explain it completely,
and is still useful.
Now, with Bruno's highly developed apparatus in arithmetics, quanta
(numbers!) look like a 'reality' as compared to our still flimsy
ideas about other qualia. Yet qualia they are (in a quantizing sense)
Language development went in parallel with a mental development.
This asymmetry may be the base for Bruno's:
"No qualia are communicable in the sense that quanta, or numbers,
are communicable."
No OTHER qualia, that is - as Brent remarked.
We can know our own qualia, but it is not clear if we can communicate
about them even to ourselves. We can experience them, or live them.
Turing (universal) and Church (thesis) are compatible products of
the presently developed state of the human mind, evolved as some
justification (base?) for the workings of the latest and still
holding) version.
Yes, and that is why we use the comp theory.
Note that the evidences for Church thesis are very big. Peope like
Rosen who believes it is false are poorly convincing. We have two kind
of evidences:
- the empirical one (all definitions of the computable functions
appear to be equivalent,
- the closure of the partial computable functions for the Cantor
diagonalization procedure.
Anyway, in science, we can only propose theories, and if we are lucky
enough someone will find us wrong and proposes a better theory.
They comfort the finite thinking (even in the infinite inclusions)
which is our restricted way to apply human logic and 'ascertainable'
reality. \
The assumption that we are relatively finite, in the 3p sense, is
really the essence of comp. It *is* our assumption. Then logic can
help to study our relations with the (many) infinities which confront
all universal machines.
Best,
Bruno
John M
On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 5:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 24 Dec 2012, at 00:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/23/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote:
Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color
can be communicated and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that
makes it more quanta than qualia. So extending your point to
Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have a language for
communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but
most people don't speak differential equations either. But those
are all things that can be shared. The pain of a headache generally
can't be perceived by two different people. But there are
experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce
objective scales of pain. So I think you are right that it is a
matter of having developed the language; I just don't think color is
the best example.
I disagree here. No qualia are communciable in the sense that
quanta, or numbers, are communicable. We can talk and understand
talk on color only because we bet that we share similar experience
in front of electromagnetic wave with certain wave-length.
We only agree on numbers and counting because we distinguish objects
in the same way.
We only can distinguish objects in the same way because we have
brain which can use numbers and count, in the universal way.
We bet it is universal and that seems to work (most of the time) -
but the same is true of representing colors by numbers. We do it
that way, instead of representing numbers by colors, because our
discrimination of colors is not quite as good as our discrimination
of objects (e.g. some people are color blind).
We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove
it. We bet on Church thesis, simply.
Bruno
Brent
Otherwise your mother could not have taught you to count.
I still feel guilty how much I made my mom suffering on this.
1, 2, What!?!, I stopped already at 2. What is that? Why?
With the amoeba I got acquainted with the 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ...
idea.
But it will take me the reading of Nagel & Newman "Gödel's proof" to
get the 0, 1, 2, 3, ... profoundness, and to decide to study
mathematics instead of biology.
Bruno
Brent
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