Hi Bruno Marchal  

No doubt you are right, except that the brain is physical, 
while, as I understand it, a UTM is mental. 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 
12/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-12-24, 05:36:51 
Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia 


On 24 Dec 2012, at 00:31, meekerdb wrote: 

> On 12/23/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> 
>> On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote: 
>> 
>>> On 10/26/2012 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>> 
>>>> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote: 
>>>> 
>>>>> Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think  
>>>>> color can be communicated and we have an "RGB" language for  
>>>>> doing so that makes it more quanta than qualia. So extending  
>>>>> your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have  
>>>>> a language for communicating the taste of wine. Most of us  
>>>>> don't speak it, but most people don't speak differential  
>>>>> equations either. But those are all things that can be shared.  
>>>>> The pain of a headache generally can't be perceived by two  
>>>>> different people. But there are experiments that use small  
>>>>> electric shocks to try to produce objective scales of pain. So  
>>>>> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed  
>>>>> the language; I just don't think color is the best example. 
>>>> 
>>>> I disagree here. No qualia are communciable in the sense that  
>>>> quanta, or numbers, are communicable. We can talk and understand  
>>>> talk on color only because we bet that we share similar  
>>>> experience in front of electromagnetic wave with certain wave-  
>>>> length. 
>>> 
>>> We only agree on numbers and counting because we distinguish  
>>> objects in the same way. 
>> 
>> We only can distinguish objects in the same way because we have  
>> brain which can use numbers and count, in the universal way. 
> 
> We bet it is universal and that seems to work (most of the time) -  
> but the same is true of representing colors by numbers. We do it  
> that way, instead of representing numbers by colors, because our  
> discrimination of colors is not quite as good as our discrimination  
> of objects (e.g. some people are color blind). 

We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it.  
We bet on Church thesis, simply. 

Bruno 



> 
> Brent 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Otherwise your mother could not have taught you to count. 
>> 
>> I still feel guilty how much I made my mom suffering on this. 
>> 
>> 1, 2, What!?!, I stopped already at 2. What is that? Why? 
>> 
>> With the amoeba I got acquainted with the 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ...  
>> idea. 
>> 
>> But it will take me the reading of Nagel & Newman "G?el's proof"  
>> to get the 0, 1, 2, 3, ... profoundness, and to decide to study  
>> mathematics instead of biology. 
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
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>> 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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