Bruno and Brent:

we  T H I N K  we have an idea what 'qualia' may be and ACCEPT our figment
on 'quanta' (i.e numbered 'objects'  - figments as well).
None of the two(?) are closer to the essence (read: 'truth') we just got
better used (evolved?) to quantitative thinking and language concerning
such because it seemed simpler to follow in primitive life. Now, with
Bruno's highly developed apparatus in arithmetics, quanta (numbers!) look
like a 'reality' as compared to our still flimsy ideas about *other *qualia.
Yet *qualia* they are (in a quantizing sense)
Language development went in parallel with a mental development.
This asymmetry may be the base for Bruno's:
 *"No qualia are communicable in the sense that quanta, or numbers, are
communicable."*
No OTHER qualia, that is - as Brent remarked.

Turing (universal) and Church (thesis) are compatible products of the
presently developed state of the human mind, evolved as some justification
(base?) for the workings of the latest and still holding) version.
They comfort the finite thinking (even in the infinite inclusions) which is
our restricted way to apply human logic and 'ascertainable' reality. \

John M



On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 5:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 24 Dec 2012, at 00:31, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 12/23/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 10/26/2012 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color
>>>>>> can be communicated and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes
>>>>>> it more quanta than qualia.  So extending your point to Schrodinger, if
>>>>>> you're a wine connoisseur you have a language for communicating the taste
>>>>>> of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but most people don't speak
>>>>>> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be
>>>>>> shared.  The pain of a headache generally can't be perceived by two
>>>>>> different people.  But there are experiments that use small electric 
>>>>>> shocks
>>>>>> to try to produce objective scales of pain.  So I think you are right 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> it is a matter of having developed the language; I just don't think color
>>>>>> is the best example.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I disagree here. No qualia are communciable in the sense that quanta,
>>>>> or numbers, are communicable. We can talk and understand talk on color 
>>>>> only
>>>>> because we bet that we share similar experience in front of 
>>>>> electromagnetic
>>>>> wave with certain wave-length.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We only agree on numbers and counting because we distinguish objects in
>>>> the same way.
>>>>
>>>
>>> We only can distinguish objects in the same way because we have brain
>>> which can use numbers and count, in the universal way.
>>>
>>
>> We bet it is universal and that seems to work (most of the time) - but
>> the same is true of representing colors by numbers.  We do it that way,
>> instead of representing numbers by colors, because our discrimination of
>> colors is not quite as good as our discrimination of objects (e.g. some
>> people are color blind).
>>
>
> We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it. We
> bet on Church thesis, simply.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Otherwise your mother could not have taught you to count.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I still feel guilty how much I made my mom suffering on this.
>>>
>>> 1, 2,  What!?!, I stopped already at 2. What is that? Why?
>>>
>>> With the amoeba I got acquainted with the 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ... idea.
>>>
>>> But it will take me the reading of Nagel & Newman "Gödel's proof" to get
>>> the 0, 1, 2, 3, ... profoundness, and to decide to study mathematics
>>> instead of biology.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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