On 10 Jan 2013, at 17:27, David Nyman wrote:

On 10 January 2013 15:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

I am still not sure this does not simply add a layer of difficulty, because it is not clear (to me) what can possibly be such a sampling.

Well, as I've said, there need be no mystery about it - it's just a way of examining one's thinking about observation in a very general way. I had a number of motivations for this idea, not the least of which is that it is more-or-less implied by the Deutsch or Barbour view of the multiverse, as Gary has commented on the FOAR list. I realise that this is not necessarily the case for CTM, so it has been interesting to discuss this possibility with you. I am not of course suggesting that individual consciousness is "literally" consequential on a single knower sampling discrete moments at random (indeed I have no idea what "literally" would mean in this connection). However I do find it instructive, in certain cases, to consider the matter *as if* this were the case. It helps (me, at least) to analyse issues of extended personal identity that can otherwise be extremely puzzling and difficult to resolve.

Deustch, Barbour, I think Bitbol, still select a particular universal number infer by nature, but CTM says that we have to find the universal numbers in our head, including the "physical", then we can compare with nature and if it does not fit, looks elsewhere. I can perhaps relate the samplings with the idea of trying to put oneself at the place of others, a good exercise for the thought experience. But self-sampling is not that easy even on simple domain like W and M, (see some discussions around here) so, sampling on "all subjective experiences", which seems to be organized in an unfathomable continuum seems quite difficult. Now, as I said once, it is perhaps equivalent with the first person indeterminacy of the smallest (up to some constant) universal number. But that's not an easy notion.
But yes that is quite interesting.




As an example, think of the interminable argument over "who is who" after replication.

With John Clark? I think the problem is solved. After the duplication, he stops to put himself at the place of any copy, by looking only to the third person view on the two first person view of the copies. He just abstract himself from the fact that the "John Clark with the story "WWMWWWMMMW" remember not having be able to predict that particular outcome he has lived. he remembers having predicted all of them, yes, but not that one in particular.




According to Hoyle the answer to "which continuation is you" in such scenarios is: all of them (to some degree),

Which is correct in the 3p view.



but not all together.

Which is correct in the 1p view.




This formulation focuses attention specifically on the momentary and retrospective nature of subjective identification and spatio- temporal localisation, and the context-dependent resolution of questions of "before" and "after". IOW, subjectively speaking, moments just "happen" and the resolution of such happenings is always retrospective. This way of thinking can be of particular utility with respect to puzzles like Mitra's "changing the future by forgetting the past".

Yes, it is the comp erasure, analog of the quantum erasure procedure, on the global (Turing) universal indeterminacy. Of course, thought experiences with memory erasure are more complex, as it is less clear to find simple valid procedure to do so (beyond the mathematics of self-reference). But it is important, it is the fusion or dedifferentiation of the histories. It should be part of the reason why the histories interfere in a wavy way.

Bruno




David



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