On 9 January 2013 18:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

* David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I
> am not sure this can work with comp.*

Don't forget that we are speaking only of a heuristic, or guide for
thought. The idea is to evaluate what consequences might follow, for the
phenomenon of "observation" in general, if it were to be considered to be
the exclusive property of a single, abstract knower which continuously
sampled, one by one, the set of all possible observer moments putatively
associable with some underlying 3p system. It is not however, as such, a
proposal for a novel mechanism of any sort. Consequently ISTM that any
fears relating to zombies would be justified only if one had a principled
reason to suppose that observable continuations of very low measure would
somehow be inaccessible to such a heuristic.

My contention is that this could not be so, by definition, but that
nonetheless such continuations would be highly atypical "events" in the
universal stream of consciousness. By this I don't simply mean that they
are unusual in themselves, but rather that any given OM (like the one "you"
are experiencing when you read this) is very unlikely to be such a
continuation. In terms of the heuristic, all experiences in the universal
stream are alike "partitioned" from each other by the intrinsic structure
of "global memory", but some experiences are destined to be remembered much
less frequently than others. Of course, in some sense, whatever is being
"observed" is always a "zombie" (i.e. we cannot discern consciousness by
observable phenomena alone) but this should not be understood to mean that
the relevant OMs, associated with each "zombie avatar", are not accessible
in due course and in due measure.


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